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Abstract
Persuasion is an exceedingly difficult task. A leading cause of this difficulty is the
misalignment of preferences, which is studied extensively by the literature on persuasion
games. However, the difficulty of communication also has a first order effect on the
outcomes and welfare of agents. Motivated by this observation, we study a model of
Bayesian Persuasion in which the communication between the sender and the receiver
is constrained. This is done by allowing the cardinality of the signal space to be less
than the cardinality of the action space and the state space, which limits the number
of action recommendations that the sender can make. Existence of a maximum to
the sender’s problem is proven and its properties are characterized. This generalizes
the standard Bayesian Persuasion framework, in which existence results rely on the
assumption of rich signal spaces. We analyze the sender’s willingness to pay for an
additional signal as a function of the prior belief, which can be interpreted as the value
of precise communication. We provide an upper bound for this value which applies to
all finite persuasion games. While increased precision is always better for the sender, we
show that the receiver might prefer coarse communication. This is done by analyzing
a game of advice seeking, where the receiver has the ability to choose the size of the
signal space.
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1 Introduction
Communication is difficult. This is especially true when the content is very complicated, and
the messages are relayed through coarse or imperfect channels. Financial analysts make rec-
ommendations to their clients about taking long or short positions on assets. Some firms give
simple recommendations such as ‘buy’, ‘sell’ or ‘hold’, while others give more fine-grained
advice, including ‘strong buy’ or ‘strong sell’. Credit rating agencies use letter grades with
the goal of communicating the riskiness of an investment. What is the effect of this coarse-
ness in communication on agents who are interacting strategically? Under what conditions
would it be optimal to send or receive information through coarse channels?
Motivated by these questions, this paper studies an information design problem between
two rational agents, a sender and a receiver, in a setting with coarse communication. The
difficulty in communication arises because the underlying space of possible states of the world
is large relative to the set of signals that can be used to describe it.
The framework of Bayesian Persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011), and in general,
information design (Bergemann and Morris 2016), analyzes strategic communication between
agents who might have misaligned preferences. In the canonical model, the sender designs
the informational environment of the receiver through a signaling scheme, creating beliefs
that will induce desirable actions. The ability of the sender to commit to a signaling scheme
distinguishes this framework from the literature on cheap talk, where similar restrictions on
signal spaces have been studied by Jager et al. (2011), among others.
We will start by giving an overview of our contributions to the rapidly expanding field
of information design and Bayesian Persuasion, and then provide a review of related work
to explain how our results complement the existing literature.
First, we generalize the Bayesian Persuasion framework to settings where the signal space
is coarse, i.e. , limited in its cardinality. The standard model assumes the existence of a large
signal space, which is rich enough to describe the state of the world perfectly, or induce all
possible actions, depending on which one of the constraints is binding. This assumption is
used to show the existence of a solution using Caratheodory’s theorem and other tools from
convex analysis. We establish the existence and describe the properties of a sender-optimal
information structure in a setting where the signal space is cardinality-constrained, hence
the standard tools for proving existence cannot be used.
Second, we analyze the effects of coarse communication for the sender and the receiver.
We show that a larger signal space always weakly improves the sender’s utility, so a sender
would be willing to pay to get access to an additional signal. We call the sender’s willingness
to pay for an additional signal the price of precision, and provide an upper bound for it which
applies to any finite Bayesian Persuasion game. The upper bound result is derived by using
a novel insight linking higher and lower dimensional information structures: namely, given
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a higher dimensional information structure, we can combine some of the induced posteriors
while still maintaining Bayes Plausibility, and create lower dimensional information struc-
tures. Doing this in a systematic way, we can show an upper bound on the gap in achievable
utilities between optimal information structures under different cardinality constraints. We
also analyze how the price of precision depends on the location of the prior, and the diffi-
culty (for the sender) of inducing beneficial actions while maintaining Bayes Plausibility. We
show that the price of precision can be non-monotonic: e.g. the second signal can be more
valuable than the third one, or vice versa.
Next, we show that the effect of additional signals on receiver’s utility is ambiguous in
general. We analyze a game of optimal advice seeking, where the receiver has the ability to
choose the size of the signal space. Intuitively, this is a setting where the receiver can ask
for simple or complicated recommendations from the sender. This framework can capture
situations where the receiver has power on the communication procedure. We show through
an example that there exists equilibria where the receiver optimally chooses to ask for ‘sim-
ple advice’ with fewer action recommendations. Through our example we also show that
restricting the cardinality of the signal space might not lead to less informative information
structures, in the sense of Blackwell informativeness.
Finally, our analysis of this problem makes a theoretical contribution by developing a
novel method for finding sender-optimal information structures in persuasion games. A key
insight we develop is using Choquet’s Theorem to analyze optimal information structures,
represented as probability measures over the extreme points of low-dimensional simplices.
This characterization is closely related to the study of generalized barycentric coordinates
(Warren 1996, 2003; Warren et al. 2007). This approach allows us to solve information de-
sign problems where concavification methods cannot be used directly. In addition to our
theoretical results, we provide intuitive geometric tools to analyze persuasion games in set-
tings with coarse signal spaces. The concavification method developed in Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011) analyzes the convex hull of the hypograph of the sender utility, which can
be inspected to understand the properties of optimal information structures. We define the
related concept of k-convex hull of a set, which is the set of points that can be represented as
the convex combination of at most k points. We show that the set of achievable utilities for
a sender in a game where the signal space has cardinality |S| “ k is given by the k-convex
hull of the hypograph of sender utility.
Previous work on persuasion games has introduced costs for generating precise infor-
mation structures, where the costs are usually motivated through information theoretic
foundations: an example is assuming that the costs are proportional to the reduction in
the entropy of prior beliefs (Gentzkow and Kamenica 2014). This approach still allows the
sender to make arbitrarily many action recommendations subject to a cost, and the exis-
tence results rely on having a high dimensional signal space. Similarly, limitations to the
informativeness of posteriors in a persuasion game can rise endogenously in a setting where
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the receiver has mental costs associated with processing more informative signals. This phe-
nomenon has been analyzed under various specific preference structures, where the sender
chooses to induce less informative posteriors due to increasing costs for paying attention to
informative signals on the receiver side (Wei 2018; Bloedel and Segal 2018; Lipnowski and
Mathevet 2018).
While we assume exogenous restrictions on the signal space to prove our main results,
we provide multiple applications in section 4, where our model can be used to analyze set-
tings in which limitations on the signal space can arise endogenously. Our analysis of advice
seeking games, where a receiver determines the cardinality of the signal space, is similar to
the setting with binary states and signals analyzed in Ichihashi (2019), in which the receiver
limits the Blackwell informativeness of the signals. As we will see in one of our examples,
optimal information structures under different cardinality constraints are not always Black-
well comparable, so using Blackwell-Informativeness constraints and cardinality constraints
will lead to different outcomes in general.
In a related paper to ours, Dughmi et al. (2016) examine the properties of a persuasion
game with a restricted number of signals, but in the specific context of bilateral trade with
assumptions on the underlying preference structure. They also prove the NP-hardness of
approximating optimal sender utility in general persuasion games with coarse signals. Our
focus is on proving existence, characterizing the properties of the sender-optimal information
structure and analyzing the various implications of coarse communication rather than the
computational complexity of calculating the equilibrium sender utility.
Two recent papers analyze noisy persuasion games with similar motivating questions.
Le Treust and Tomala (2019) study a repeated game of persuasion, where the sender has
limited opportunities to intervene and send information through a noisy and cardinality-
constrained channel. While they don’t prove the existence of a maximum, their main result
is an upper bound on achievable utilities by the sender. They also show that this bound
is reached in the limit where the number of repetitions of the underlying game approaches
infinity. Their result can be modified to apply to our setting with noiseless channels and
a coarse signal space, giving an upper bound on the utility of the sender. This asymptotic
result is shown by making an elegant connection to Shannon’s coding theorem. Similarly,
Tsakas and Tsakas (2018) focus on persuasion through noisy communication channels in a
single persuasion game. They show that the effect of noise on sender utility is ambiguous in
general, and within the class of symmetric noisy communication channels, more noise makes
the sender worse off.
Our theoretical results complement the asymptotic framework of Le Treust and Tomala
(2019): we focus on a single game and prove the existence of an optimal solution and give a
sharp characterization of its properties. We also provide an upper bound result on achievable
utilities with cardinality constraints, which provides a bound on the loss of utility due to
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coarseness in communication that applies to all finite persuasion games. We also show that
coarse communication always makes the sender worse off, as opposed to the case with noise
where the effect is ambiguous, as is shown in Tsakas and Tsakas (2018). Our analyses of
the value of precision and games of advice seeking also provide substantive applications for
constrained persuasion games in various market settings.
While noisy channels make communication between parties more difficult, the restrictions
on implementable information structures are different compared to cardinality constraints.
Le Treust and Tomala (2019) show that asymptotically, all that matters for sender utility is
the channel’s capacity, which is affected both by the inherent noise in communication and
the cardinality of the signal space. However, noisy and coarse signals have substantively
different implications on the optimal information structure and achievable utilities for the
sender in finite games. Noise prevents the sender from inducing posteriors where the receiver
is certain about the state of the world, and there are no explicit restrictions on the number
of inducable actions. Thus, the receiver can never be perfectly informed and there is always
residual uncertainty in beliefs. With cardinality constraints, while the sender can induce
informative posteriors, it’s never possible to perfectly inform the receiver about all states
of the world at the same time. Thus, the sender has to prioritize some of the actions that
can be induced with its limited capabilities while also maintaining Bayes Plausibility, which
leads to different outcomes.
Mathematically, with noisy channels, the sender’s choice is restricted to information
structures in which posteriors are not too close to the extreme points of the simplex. With
cardinality constraints, there are no restrictions on the locations of the posteriors, but the
sender’s problem reduces to optimally choosing a lower dimensional object embedded in a
higher dimensional probability simplex (i.e., a line segment within the 3-simplex, or a tri-
angle within the 4-simplex). This is also why we cannot use the intuitive concavification
approach in our setting. Suppose the signal space is constrained to have cardinality K. It
will not be possible to achieve all utility levels on the convex hull of the epigraph of sender
utility. Specifically, if a utility level can only be achieved as a convex combination of more
than K points, it will not be implementable in our setting. This insight will be clarified when
we define the concept of a K-convex hull.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a simple example and
highlights some of the insights that will be analyzed in later sections. We introduce our
model and provide our existence results in section 3. Section 4 provides applications for
our model, where we analyze the value of precise communication, optimal advice seeking,
and preferences for simple signals in persuasion. We conclude in section 5. All proofs and
additional results appear in the appendix.
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2 A simple example: Financial Advice
We analyze a simple example with 3 states and 3 actions. The sender is a financial institu-
tion and the receiver is a risk neutral customer, looking for advice on a financial position.
The customer can take a long or short position on an asset, or do nothing. There is a fixed
amount of the asset that the customer can choose to buy or sell. The value of the asset can
increase, in which case the optimal action is to take a long position, it can decrease, in which
case the optimal action is a short position, or it could hold steady, in which case the optimal
action is doing nothing. Suppose for simplicity, that the value of the asset can increase or
decrease by 1. There is also a risk free asset which the consumer can purchase as an outside
option, which provides a small return of r “ 0.3. In addition, the institution can charge
commissions to the customer, denoted by c, which can be any real number. The payoff of
the institution is the commission it can charge. The payoff for the customer is 0 if no action
is taken, 1 if the correct position is taken, and ´1 if the incorrect position is taken, minus
the forfeited returns on the risk-free asset and commissions.
Let p`, p0, p´ denote the common beliefs that the asset’s value will increase, hold steady,
or decrease, respectively, where p`` p0` p´ “ 1. The sender (financial institution) and the
receiver (customer) share a prior µ0 which is in the interior of the three dimensional simplex.
Sender commits to a signaling mechanism, using signals from a finite set S, where |S| “ 3.
As is usual in the Bayesian Persuasion literature, by a signaling mechanism, we mean a
collection of probability measures over S, one for each realization of the (uncertain) state
of the world. The sender commits to this strategy prior to the realization of the state, and
cannot change it afterwards. The receiver observes the signal (not the state of the world),
and uses Bayesian updating to obtain posterior probabilities of each state conditional on the
observed signal. It should be noted that signals s P S do not have an intrinsic meaning,
but obtain their meaning in equilibrium via the announced signaling mechanism. After the
signal is realized and the posterior beliefs are formed, the sender decides on the commission
that will be charged. Finally, the receiver chooses their action.
Formally, the receiver’s expected payoff will be p` ´ p´ ´ r ´ c when taking a long po-
sition, and p` ´ p´ ´ r ´ c when taking a short position. For any given belief, the receiver
will choose to take a position over doing nothing if and only if |p´ ´ p`| ´ r ´ c ě 0. The
sender can therefore extract all the surplus by optimally setting c “ |p´ ´ p`| ´ r. Note
that the commissions will be higher if the posterior beliefs approach the extreme points of
the simplex. Intuitively, the financial institution can charge higher commissions for inducing
more precise posteriors, from customers that will have very optimistic or very pessimistic
beliefs about the asset.
With |S| “ 3, finding the optimal information structure and calculating the maximum
sender utility achievable is easily done by inspecting the concavification of sender utility. The
optimal information structure will induce beliefs on the extreme points of the simplex: the
customer is absolutely sure about what will happen to the asset when he receives a signal.
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Letting the prior be µ0 “ pp`, p0, p´q “ p0.3, 0.4, 0.3q, the optimal information structure will
induce p1, 0, 0q with probability 0.3, p0, 1, 0q with probability 0.4, and p0, 0, 1q with proba-
bility 0.3.
With |S| “ 2, solving for the optimal information structure is not straightforward: we
can no longer use concavification. It turns out that the optimal information structure in
this case induces the belief p1, 0, 0q with probability 0.3, and induces the belief p0, 0.57, 0.43q
with probability 0.7. The customer is still willing to take a short position, but the beliefs
are now less extreme compared to the case with three signals. The resulting expected utility
for the institution is therefore lower.
Figure 1: The financial advice example. The first plot shows the sender utility function over the simplex.
The second plot shows the concavification of sender utility, where the red dot corresponds to the maximum
utility achievable by the sender. The third plot shows the optimal information structure for the sender using
two signals. The black dot corresponds to the maximum utility achievable with 2 signals, shown together
with the maximum utility achievable with 3 signals.
The example demonstrates some of the key insights that will be generalized in this paper.
First, the induced beliefs are located on the boundaries of the regions where the receiver’s
action is fixed. This is developed further in section 3.2. Second, the search for an optimal
information structure is equivalent to searching for the highest value achievable by taking
the convex combination of two points from the graph of the sender utility function. We
formalize this insight in section 3.3. Third, the utility achievable by the sender is lower with
two signals, hence the sender would be willing to pay to get access to additional signals.
The loss in sender utility will be defined as the ‘value of precision’ in section 4.1, where we
analyze it in more detail and provide upper bounds.
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3 Model and Results
3.1 Setup
There are two agents, a sender and a receiver, which are communicating about an uncertain
state of the world. The state of the world ω can take values from a finite set Ω, which has
cardinality |Ω| “ n. There are finitely many actions a P A that can be taken by the receiver,
where |A| “ m. The two agents have utility functions which depend on the state of the
world and the receiver’s action, respectively denoted by: uS, uR : Ω ˆ A Ñ R. The agents
share a prior belief about the state of the world, µ0, which is assumed to be in the interior of
∆pΩq that is denoted by intp∆pΩqq.1 It is common knowledge that the agents hold a shared
prior. The sender chooses a signaling policy which is a collection of conditional probability
mass functions tpip.|ωquωPΩ over the signal space S with cardinality |S| “ k. Critically, we
assume k ă mintm,nu. With this assumption we focus on coarse communication. Thus, the
sender cannot induce all possible actions or describe the state of the world perfectly, and
has to decide which actions to induce through coarse communication while also maintaining
Bayes Plausibility.
Each signal realization s P S induces a posterior which is formed through Bayesian updat-
ing: The receiver observes a signal realization s P S and forms a posterior belief µs P ∆pΩq.
Hence, we can think of the collection tpip.|ωquωPΩ as inducing a probability measure over pos-
teriors. We denote this probability measure over posteriors by τ P ∆p∆pΩqq. τ is a discrete
probability measure with support supp pτq “ µ “ tµsusPS.2 Throughout the paper, τ will be
called an information structure. Naturally, by the restrictions imposed above, we will have
1 ă |supp pτq| ď k. The vector of probabilities of inducing a posterior belief that is in the
support of the information structure τ will be denoted by τpµq. Formally, for µs P supp pτq,
the probability that µs will be induced is given by τpµsq “ řωPΩ pips|ωqµ0pωq.
After forming the posterior µs, the receiver chooses an action from the set Aˆpµsq “
arg maxaPA Eω„µsuRpa, ωq.3 If the receiver is indifferent between multiple actions, we assume
that the indifference is resolved by picking the action that is preferred by the sender. If
there are multiple such elements that maximize the sender’s utility, we pick an element from
Aˆpµsq arbitrarily.
Sender’s utility when the posterior µs is induced will be uˆ
Spµsq “ Eω„µsuSpaˆpµsq, ωq.
Similarly, receiver’s utility will be uˆRpµsq “ Eω„µsuRpaˆpµsq, ωq. The expected utility of
1∆pΩq denotes the simplex over Ω “ tω1, ω2, . . . , ωku.
2µs denotes the posterior induced by s which is a generic element of S, and µi denotes the i
th entry of
µ “ supp pτq. So we use µi to refer a specific entry of µ and µs to generic posteriors receiver forms upon
observing a generic signal s P S.
3The notation Eω„µs is used to denote the expectation over the random variable ω taken with respect to
the measure µs. When the random variable is clear, we will just use the measure that gives the probability
distribution on the subscript.
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sender under the information structure τ is denoted by Eµs„τ uˆSpµsq : ∆p∆pΩqq Ñ R. We
similarly define the expected receiver utility under τ by Eµs„τ uˆRpµsq.
For a distribution of posteriors to be feasibly induced in the persuasion game with shared
priors, we need the expected value of the posterior beliefs to be equal to the prior belief.
This is the only restriction imposed by Bayesian Rationality (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011),
which we can state formally by Eµs„τµs “
ř
µsPsupp pτq µsτpµsq “ µ0. The sender’s goal is
therefore finding the optimal τ , which is described by the problem:
max
τP∆p∆pΩqq
Eµs„τ uˆSpµsq subject to |supp pτq| ď k and Eτ pµsq “ µ0
Formulating the sender’s problem as a search for an optimal information structure τ
rather than a search for signal functions tpip.|ωquωPΩ makes the problem more tractable.
Given a feasible information structure τ and corresponding probabilities for each posterior
belief tτpµsqusPS in our model, we can always find the related signal functions by writ-
ing pips|ωq “ µspωqτpµsq
µ0pωq . The more interesting problem of finding the probability measuretτpµsqusPS that make τ Bayes Plausible given only the posterior beliefs µ “ tµ1, . . . , µku will
also be discussed when we present our existence result. We will show that these probabilities
are uniquely defined if µ consists of affinely independent posteriors.
The constraint on the signal space makes solving the sender’s problem considerably more
difficult compared to the standard Bayesian Persuasion framework. Note that it is no longer
possible to use Caratheodory theorem to show the existence of an optimal signal. The
achievable set of utilities can shrink considerably for the sender, compared to the baseline
model with unrestricted communication.
3.2 Existence and Properties of the Solution
One simple implication of limiting the dimensionality of the signal space is that it is not
possible to induce posterior distributions supported exclusively on the extreme points of the
n-dimensional simplex ∆pΩq. This is because the convex hull of k ă n extreme points of
the simplex cannot include µ0 which is assumed to be in intp∆pΩqq. The limitation also
constrains the sender’s ability of making action recommendations: the sender can no longer
create information structures that will induce all possible actions. Thus the sender must
decide which actions are worth inducing with the limited signals they can use. We will
show how we can find the optimal information structure through a constructive proof, and
present its properties. Existence can also be shown by using the upper semi-continuity of
sender utility over the search space and showing the compactness of the set of Bayes Plausi-
ble information structures inducable with coarse signals. Our approach provides additional
insights about the properties of lower dimensional optimal information structures and gives
us an explicit method for finding them.
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We use the underlying preference structure for the sender and the receiver to simplify
the search for an optimal information structure τ . Formally, we can define subsets of ∆pΩq
where the receiver’s action is constant, and use the fact that sender utility is convex within
these subsets.4 The properties presented in lemmas 1 and 2 have been applied in the context
of persuasion games where the receiver has psychological preferences over different posterior
beliefs (See Lipnowski and Mathevet (2017, 2018); Volund (2018)).
Definition 1. The set Ra Ď ∆pΩq is the set of beliefs where the action a is receiver-optimal:
Ra “ tµi P ∆pΩq : a P Aˆpµiqu
R “ tRauaPA is the collection consisting of these sets for every action a P A.5
Lemma 1. For every action a P A, the set Ra is closed and convex.
Lemma 2. The sender’s utility uˆS is convex when restricted to each set Ra.
Lemma 1 follows from the fact that each Ra can be written as the intersection of finitely
many closed half spaces. The proof of lemma 2 uses the definition of uˆS, which is a function
of sender-optimal actions at every belief. For any two points µ1, µ2 in a given Ra, let the
sender-optimal action be aˆpµq at their convex combination µ. This action must be among
the set of receiver-optimal actions for the two original points. Since the action aˆpµq is defined
as the action that maximizes sender utility among the set of receiver-optimal actions Aˆpµq,
and we have aˆpµq P Aˆpµ1q and aˆpµq P Aˆpµ2q, convexity of uˆS follows.
Let us define beneficial information structures as τ with Eτ puˆSq ě uˆSpµ0q. These are
information structures that give the sender higher utility compared to the default action,
which can be achieved by sending no information. Throughout the paper, we will maintain
the assumption that beneficial information structures exist: the other case is trivial and the
sender always prefers sending no information.
The first two lemmas show us that in the subspace where the receiver’s action is fixed,
sender prefers inducing mean-preserving spreads in beliefs. In the model with unrestricted
communication, these properties reduce the search for an optimal information structure
to a more tractable optimization problem, since the optimal information structure must
be supported by the outer points of the sets R “ tRauaPA as described in Lipnowski and
Mathevet (2017). With coarse communication, we can prove a similar result. The next
lemma formally states that an information structure can always be weakly improved by
changing it in a way that maintains Bayes Plausiblity and moving all posteriors to the
boundaries of an action region. In other words, the sender can restrict their search to
posteriors that make the receiver indifferent between multiple actions (and posteriors located
on the boundaries of the n-simplex ∆pΩq ), with no loss in utility. This result reduces the size
of our search space considerably, and provides tractability in higher dimensional problems.
4In the appendix, we also establish that sender utility is a continuous and piecewise linear function in
the interior of these sets.
5R is a finite cover of ∆pΩq.
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Lemma 3. Let τ be a feasible distribution of posteriors satisfying Bayes Plausibility, that
is also beneficial for the sender. Suppose that Dµa P supp pτq such that µa P intpRaq for
some Ra P R. Then, there exists a µk P BdpRaq and a Bayes Plausible τ 1 ‰ τ where
supp pτ 1q “ psupp pτq{tµauq Y tµku such that Eτ 1uˆS ě Eτ uˆS.
An immediate corollary of lemma 3 is the following result.
Corollary 1. The sender’s search for an optimal information structure can be restricted
to information structures τ with the following property: @µs P supp pτq, ERa P R such that
µs P intpRaq.
The proof explicitly constructs the information structure τ 1, and uses the convexity of
uˆS within each Ra. The outline of the argument is the following. Let τ be our origi-
nal Bayes Plausible information structure, with the corresponding probabilities tτpµiquiďk
where
ř
iďk τpµiqµi “ µ0. Let µa P supp pτq be in the interior of some Ra and define the
ray originating from µ0 and passing through µa. This ray will intersect the boundary of Ra
at two points µ1 and µ2, since Ra is compact and convex. By convexity of uˆS within Ra,
sender utility must be weakly higher at one of those two points. First, we show that we can
replace µa with one of these two points and still maintain Bayes Plausibility. Since we’re
changing µa along the ray defined above, we can change tτpµiquiďk in a way that maintains
Bayes Plausibility. Note that greedily replacing µa with the point that provides higher util-
ity within Ra might not always improve the expected sender utility Eτ puˆSq, and the overall
effect of this change depends on the relative positions of µ0, µa, µ
1 and µ2, and the change
in the probabilities tτpµiquiďk that will maintain Bayes Plausibility. A carefully constructed
argument relying on convexity shows that replacing µa with either µ
1 or µ2 will always yield
higher expected utility, where the decision on which point to choose depends on the changes
in tτpµiquiďk.
While this simplifies the search, to solve and characterize the sender maximization prob-
lem in a tractable way, we still need to understand how the probabilities tτpµiquiďk change as
we make changes to the beliefs in supp pτq under the restriction that Eτ pµsq “ řiďk τpµiqµi “
µ0.
Each Bayes Plausible information structure τ defines a lower dimensional compact convex
polytope embedded in the space ∆pΩq Ă Rn, with the extreme points supp pτq. Bayes Plau-
sibility implies µ0 must be in the convex hull of the information structure, µ0 P copsupp pτqq
with the representation
ř
iďk τpµiqµi “ µ0 where co denotes the convex hull operator. This
representation can be thought of a discrete probability measure over the convex polytope
copµ1, . . . , µkq, with positive values only on the extreme points. The probability measure
tτpµiquiďk may not be unique in general. However, if supp pτq consists of affinely indepen-
dent beliefs, we can show that the representation is, indeed, unique using Choquet’s Theorem.
We proceed by showing that we can restrict our search of optimal information structures
to the set of affinely independent information structures without any loss. The next theo-
rem shows that any affinely dependent information structure can be modified by dropping
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some beliefs to reach affine independence, increasing sender utility and maintaining Bayes
Plausibility at every step. The proof is independent of lemma 3 and holds for a general case
of information design problems with or without constrained signal spaces.
Lemma 4. Let τ be a feasible distribution of posteriors satisfying Bayes Plausibility. Suppose
that supp pτq is not affinely independent. Then, there must exist a Bayes Plausible τ 1 ‰ τ
such that supp pτ 1q is affinely independent and Eτ 1uˆS ě Eτ uˆS.
Intuitively, for the sender, inducing affinely dependent beliefs is not a good use of signals
because some beliefs are redundant. The proof outlines the details on how we can always
find a belief that is optimal to drop from the information structure. Because the beliefs can
be written as an affine combination of each other, we can always choose a belief to drop
such that the change in tτpµiquiďk guarantees higher sender utility. We use the relationship
between the convex weights characterizing µ0 which are tτpµiquiďk, and the set of affine
weights that allows us to characterize beliefs in terms of each other.
Lemma 4 states that we can restrict our search to affinely independent information struc-
tures, or in other words, lower dimensional simplices contained in the n-simplex ∆pΩq. This
gives us the uniqueness of the probability measure tτpµiquiďk representing µ0 through Cho-
quet’s theorem. The statement of this well known result (e.g., see Alfsen (1965)) is as
follows.
Theorem (Choquet Theorem). Suppose that P is a metrizable compact convex subset of a
locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space, and that µ0 is an element of P . Then there
is a probability measure τ on P which represents µ0 i.e.
ř
pPP τppqp “ µ0 s.t. supp pτq “
ExtpP q, where ExtpP q denotes the extreme points of P . Furthermore, if ExtpP q is affinely
independent, this probability measure τ is unique.
We turn to the question of how this probability measure changes as we change beliefs in
supp pτq. If we perturb the set of beliefs induced (while maintaining Bayes Plausibility), we
would like to be able to analyze how the corresponding probability of inducing each belief
changes.6 We can do this by using the fact that the convex hull of the posterior beliefs
induced is a compact and convex polytope.7
Lemma 5. Let µ0 P intp∆pΩqq, define ζ Ă RkˆN as the set of affinely independent set of
posteriors with cardinality k that are Bayes Plausible. @µ “ pµ1, . . . , µkq P ζ, there exists
a unique probability distribution over τ P ∆p∆pΩqq with support µ and řiďk τpµiqµi “ µ0.
Moreover, τ : ζ Ñ Rk is uniformly continuous.
6Existence, smoothness and uniqueness of this probability measure can be analyzed through barycentric
coordinates by making use of existing work on generalized barycentric coordinates on convex sets (Warren
1996, 2003; Warren et al. 2007), but we use Choquet Theory as a more convenient tool.
7A similar result is theorem 19.3 in (Rockafellar 1970), which shows that orthogonal projection of poly-
hedral convex set P Ă RN on subspace L is another polyhedral convex set and linear maps map polyhedral
convex sets to polyhedral convex sets in finite dimensional vector spaces.
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The proof relies on the affine independence of µ and characterizes the change in the
weights τpµq as we change µ to µ1 as a matrix operation. With this result, we can formulate
the sender’s problem as a search over Bayes Plausible information structures that are affinely
independent, with the added constraint that @µi P supp pτq, µi is in the boundary of some
Ra. The boundary of a given Ra consists of facets of a polytope. Each set Ra will have at
most m facets, which can be seen from their definition.
Definition 2. Choose at most k facets from any collection of polytopes from R “ tRauaPA,
and denote them by F “ tFi : Da P A,Fi is a facet of Rau.8
For a given collection F , denote the restriction of the sender utility function uˆS to a facet
Fi P F by ˆˆuSi . Define the set of affinely independent Bayes Plausible information structures
that are supported on F by:
ζF “
˜
ζ X
˜
ką
i“1
tFiu
¸¸
.
Where
Śk
i“1tFiu denotes the Cartesian product of the sets Fi.
Since each Fi is a subset of Rn and ζ is a subset of RkˆN , ζF is also a subset of RkˆN .
The above definition allows us to characterize sender’s maximization as a search for the facet
collection on which the optimal information structure is supported on.
Definition 3. Given a collection F “ tFiuiďk, the sender’s problem subject to the constraint
that the information structure must be supported on the facets F is given by the following:
max
τ
ÿ
iďk
τpµiquˆSi pµiq subject to: tµ1, . . . , µku P ζF
Denote the maximized value of this problem (if a maximum exists) by V pF, µ0, kq, with
the added convention that V pF, µ0, kq “ ´8 if the feasible set ζF is empty. The convention
of V pF, µ0, kq “ ´8 is required because of the fact that it might be impossible to represent
µ0 for some collection of facets.
Definition 4. Let F denote the finite set of all possible collections F . We can characterize
the sender’s maximization problem as follows:
max
FPF pV pF, µ0, kqq .
With this definition, we can show that the sender’s maximization problem is well defined
and an optimal information structure will always exist.
Theorem 1. An optimal information structure τ P ∆p∆pΩqq Ă RkˆN maximizing the sender
objective function exists.
8Note that this definition allows us to use the same set Ra arbitrarily many times in defining the collection
F.
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The proof characterizes the search for an optimal information structure as a search for
the set of facets on which the optimal information structure is supported on. A couple of
technical difficulties remain that we address in the full proof in the appendix: observe that
the sender utility can have jump discontinuities on a given facet Fi. Moreover, the set of
feasible points ζF might not be a compact set. Hence, the proof relies on a non-trivial two-
step continuous extension argument. We first define the continuous extension of the sender
utility over the closures of the relevant sets, for which a maximum must always exist by an
application of simple topological extreme value theorem. We then show that the original
problem must attain the same maximum with the modified problem for the continuous ex-
tension, through an application of Theorem 4.9
Our analysis of cardinality-constrained signal spaces also is also useful for Bayesian Per-
suasion games with rich signal spaces where agents have preferences for simplicity. In a
standard Bayesian Persuasion where k ě mint|A|, |Ω|u, suppose the sender cares about the
simplicity of the induced information structures, in addition to the utility received. In ap-
pendix B.4, we analyze this setting by defining an intuitive preference structure for the
sender, and show that affinely independent information structures will be chosen at an equi-
librium.
3.3 Achievable utilities and concavification
We proceed by showing that the solution to the maximization problem in definition 4 will
be equivalent to a geometric characterization of the optimum. We call this characterization
the k-concavification of sender utility. This will connect our solution technique to the con-
cavification approach widely used in the Bayesian Persuasion literature.
Let CHpuˆSq denote the convex hull of the hypograph of uˆS, in the space Rn. With
unrestricted communication, the point pµ0, zq P CHpuˆSq Ă Rn represents a sender pay-
off z which can achieved by an information structure when the prior is µ0.
10 This is the
foundation of the concavification technique, first used in repeated games and then applied
to Bayesian Persuasion and information design (Aumann and Maschler 1995; Kamenica
and Gentzkow 2011). In canonical persuasion games, the existence of an optimal signal
is usually proven by referencing extremal representation theorems from convex analysis.
For any pµ, zq P CHpuˆSq, Caratheodory’s theorem assures the existence of a τ such that
µ P copsupp pτqq and |supp pτq| ě n ` 1, where co denotes the convex hull operator. Note
that the last condition prevents us from using this theorem in our setting.
With restricted communication, the point pµ, zq P CHpuˆSq might not be feasible if the
9An alternative proof is showing that the sender utility can be extended to an upper semi-continuous
function defined over a compact set, but the proof we provide is more constructive in nature and has an
algorithm for finding the equilibrium.
10Since uˆS : ∆pΩq Ñ R, we can represent any belief µ with |Ω| ´ 1 “ n´ 1 dimensions, and uˆSpµq with a
real number, so pµ, zq P Rn.
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construction of pµ, zq requires a convex combination of more than k points from the hypo-
graph of uˆS. A prior belief-utility pair pµ, zq will only be feasible if it can be contained in the
convex hull of k or fewer points from the hypograph of uˆS. To represent achievable utilities,
therefore, we need the following definition.
Definition 5. Given a set A Ď Rn and an integer 0 ă k ď n, define the set of points that
can be represented as the convex combination of at most k points in A as the k-Convex
Hull of A, denoted cokpAq. Formally, a P cokpAq if and only if there exists a set of at most
k points ta1, . . . , aku Ď A and a set of weights tγ1, . . . , γku which satisfy řiďk γi “ 1 and@i, 1 ą γi ą 0 such that a “ řiďk γiai. Therefore, we can write:
cokpAq “ ta P Rn : Dta1, . . . , aku Ď A, Dtγ1, . . . , γku with γi P R s.t.
ÿ
iďk
γi “ 1 and 1 ě γi ě 0, a “
ÿ
iďk
γiaiu
Let CHkpuˆSq denote the k-convex hull of the hypograph of uˆS, in the space Rn. Note
that if pµ0, zq P CHkpuˆSq, there exists an information structure τ with supp pτq ď k and
the Eτ puˆSq “ z. Defining V pµ0q “ suptz|pµ0, zq P CHkpuˆSqu, we get the largest payoff the
sender can achieve when the prior is µ0. If V pµ0q “ z, then we have k beliefs such thatř
iďk τpµiqµi “ µ0 for some set of weights tτpµ1q, . . . , τpµkqu and
ř
iďk τpµiquˆSpµiq “ z. This
gives us the following equivalence between k-concavification and our previous result.
Theorem 2. Let τ be the optimal information structure that solves the sender’s maximiza-
tion problem given in definition 4. Then suptz|pµ0, zq P CHkpuˆSqu “ Eτ uˆS.
Going back to the financial advice example, we can see in figure 2 that the optimal payoff
for the sender given µ0 can be observed by inspecting the 2-convex hull of the sender utility.
The comparison with the regular convex hull (3-convex hull) reveals that the achieved util-
ity must be lower. The optimal information structure can thus be determined by inspecting
CHkpuˆSq Ă Rn.
4 Applications
4.1 The Value of Precision
We can further analyze the implications of restricting the signal space on sender’s utility.
Let V ˚pk, µ0q be the value the sender objective function attains at µ0 when the signal space
is restricted to have k elements. Then V ˚pk ` 1, µ0q ´ V ˚pk, µ0q is what the sender would
be willing to pay to increase the dimensionality of the signal space by one, given the fixed
prior µ0. This can be intuitively interpreted as the value of precision for the sender. Note
that when k ě mint|Ω|, |A|u, the value of precision will be equal to zero by the results in
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Figure 2: The supremum of the 3-convex hull and the 2-convex hull of sender utility from the financial
advice example. The left figure shows the maximum achievable utility with 3 signals, and the right figure
shows the maximum achievable utility with 2 signals as a function of the prior beliefs. The dots correspond
to the prior belief given in the example (µ0 “ p0.3, 0.4, 0.3q).
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). Therefore we focus exclusively on the coarse communica-
tion setting in which k ă mint|Ω|, |A|u.
The value of precision depends on the structure of the sender and receiver utility func-
tions, and the location of the prior belief µ0. It critically depends on what actions the sender
can induce while still maintaining Bayes Plausibility. If maintaining Bayes Plausibility with
lower dimensional signals requires inducing actions with lower payoffs, or inducing a pos-
terior located in a low-payoff yielding portion of an action region, then the sender will be
willing to pay more for more precise communication.
We establish an upper bound on the value of precision, or equivalently, a lower bound on
the utility achievable with k´1 signals which applies to any finite persuasion game. Because
of the geometric structure of the problem and the subtle relationship between V ˚pk, µ0q and
V ˚pk ´ 1, µ0q, the loss in utility cannot be too high.
Theorem 3. Suppose |S| “ k ě 3, and the sender utility function uS is positive everywhere.
Then, the following upper bound must hold for the value of precision at k ´ 1 signals:
V ˚pk, µ0q ´ V ˚pk ´ 1, µ0q ď 2
k
V ˚pk, µ0q
Thus, we show that the utility attainable with k ´ 1 signals must lie between k´2
k
V ˚pkq
and V ˚pkq. This provides a lower bound on the utility loss from using smaller signal spaces,
as a function of utility achievable with unrestricted communication. Let τk˚ and τk˚´1 be
the optimal information structures using k and k ´ 1 signals, respectively. The proof relies
on the observation that τk˚ can be ‘collapsed’ to get an information structure with k ´ 1
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signals by combining two posteriors in a way that maintains Bayes Plausibility. These new
signals must provide weakly less utility compared to τk˚´1. We can construct k different k´1
dimensional information structures using this method by combining the posteriors that are
in the support of τk˚ pairwise and leaving the rest of the posteriors the same as τk˚ . The
utilities provided by these new information structures are related to V ˚pk, µ0q, because they
contain k´ 2 posteriors which are also in the support of τk˚ . The resulting inequalities yield
the lower bound in theorem 3.
4.1.1 Example: Non-Monotonicity of the Value of Precision
We will show that the value of precision can be non-monotone in general. We analyze an
example with 3 states of the world to demonstrate how the behavior of the value of precision
can depend on the location of the prior. In our example we will see that V ˚p2, µ0q´V ˚p1, µ0q
can be greater or less than V ˚p3, µ0q ´ V ˚p2, µ0q. We will also demonstrate how this differ-
ence depends on the difficulty of inducing beneficial actions for the sender.
Let Ω “ tω1, ω2, ω3u. There are four actions available to the receiver A “ ta0, a1, a2, a3u.
We consider a Bayesian Persuasion game where the sender has an optimal action for each
state and a default safe action. This can be represented with receiver preferences of the form:
uRpa, ωiq “
$’&’%
0 if a “ a0
1´p¯i
p¯i
if a “ ai @i P t1, 2, 3u
´1 if a ‰ ai @i P t1, 2, 3u
These preferences can be used to model situations in which for each state ωi action ai is
optimal, and mismatching the state i.e. taking action aj j ‰ 0 andj ‰ i is costly, with cost
normalized to unity. Finally, a0 is the safe action. Such receiver preferences lead to action
thresholds over the simplex of posterior beliefs.
Let us denote µspωiq by µis, where µis is the ith coordinate of a given posterior belief µs.
One can think of µspωq as the probability distribution over Ω induced by µs.
For each state, there is a corresponding preferred action ai which is taken by the receiver
if and only if the receiver believes the state of the world is ωi with at least probability
p¯i. Specifically, the receiver prefers action ai P ta1, a2, a3u if and only if the posterior belief
µs P ∆pΩq such that µis ě p¯i, and prefers a0 otherwise. Hence, we can say that for i P t1, 2, 3u,
j P t0, 1, 2, 3u and j ‰ i we have that EµsruRpai, ωqs ě EµsruRpaj, ωqs if and only if µis ą p¯i.
The action zones for these receiver preferences can be represented as:
Ri “ tµs P ∆pωq|µis ě p¯iu
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Sender preferences are such that @ω P Ω, uspa0, ωq “ 0 and uspai, ωq “ 1. Thus, the
sender only cares about actions and not the states, and aims to induce the non-default ac-
tions. The parameter p¯i can be interpreted as the difficulty of inducing the beneficial actions
for the sender.
Given this structure, it should be obvious that sender can attain a payoff of 1 by using
3-signal information structures. This follows from the fact that for every prior µ0 P ∆pΩq
with µ0 “ pµ10, µ20, µ30q the sender can use the information structure p1, 0, 0q with probability
µ10, p0, 1, 0q with probability µ20 and p0, 0, 1q with probability µ30. This information structure
corresponds to τpµsq P ∆p∆pΩqq with τpp1, 0, 0qq “ µ10, τpp0, 1, 0qq “ µ20, τpp0, 0, 1qq “ µ30.
We have that Eτuspapωq, ωq “ 1. Every point inside simplex can be represented as the con-
vex combination of the extreme points of the simplex, hence achieving the maximal utility
with 3 signals is possible for every interior prior.
With 1-signal information structures (i.e. no information transmission at all), we have
that the payoff sender can achieve is
Eµ0uspapµ0q, ωq “
#
1 if µ0 P Ri @i P t1, 2, 3u
0 if otherwise
Our goal is analyzing the non-trivial case of 2 signals. We precisely focus on priors µ0 that
are in R0, as for priors in Ri for i P t1, 2, 3u the maximal payoff can be obtained with
no information transmission at all. We define ∆c as the set where two-signal information
structures attain lower payoff than three-signal information structures. The following lemma
states the values of p¯i such that this set is non-empty.
Lemma 6. ∆c ‰ H if and only if p¯i ě 23 .
For thresholds p¯i ď 2
3
, two-dimensional information structures suffice for achieving maxi-
mal utility. We restrict attention to cases where p¯i ą 2
3
. In this regime, we can state that for
any prior in ∆c, the utility attained by two-signal information structures is bounded within
two values.
Lemma 7. If p¯i ą 2
3
we have that V p2, µ0q ă V p3, µ0q “ 1 for every µ0 P ∆c and V p2, µ0q “
V p3, µ0q “ 1 for every µ0 R ∆c. Moreover, @µ0 P ∆c, V p2, µ0q ą V p2, µ0q ą V p2, µ0q, where
V p2, µ0q “ 2p¯i´1p¯i and V p2, µ0q “ 13p¯i .
In figure 4, we plot V p2, µ0q and V p2, µ0q as a function of the action threshold p¯i. The
following is an immediate implication of lemma 7. Fixing the preferences of the sender and
the receiver, for some prior beliefs, the value of an additional signal is an increasing function,
and for others, it is decreasing.
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Figure 3: On the left, we have the action threshold p¯i “ 23 so it is possible to maintain Bayes Plausibility
when inducing non-default actions for every prior. On the right, p¯i ą 23 , so for some beliefs, we have to
mix the default action and the non-default action when constrained to 2 signals. The dark red, blue and
green regions are the beneficial action regions. The yellow middle region is the default action region. Orange
region in the right figure corresponds to ∆c.
Figure 4: Achievable utilities with two signals for µ0 P ∆c, as a function of the action thresholds p¯i. Blue
line depicts the minimum of the equilibrium sender utility among all µ0 P ∆c, and yellow line denotes the
maximum value.
Corollary 2. Depending on the location of the prior inside ∆c the value of precision can
be increasing or decreasing with respect to additional signals. That is V p2, µ0q ą 12 and
V p2, µ0q ă 12 .
The priors for which the value of precision is increasing are the ones that are the furthest
away from the beneficial action regions. For the sender who only has access to two signals,
the only way to induce favorable actions with these priors is by also inducing the default
action with high probability, getting an expected utility below 0.5. Therefore, the value of
the second signal is also below 0.5. Getting access to the third signal allows the sender to
maintain Bayes Plausibility by not inducing the default action, guaranteeing a payoff of 1.
Hence, the value of the third signal is higher than 0.5.
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On the other hand, for some priors, the value of precision is decreasing. These are prior
beliefs that are already close to one of the action regions. Intuitively, if the receiver is already
leaning towards taking one action, it is easy to induce that action with a high probability,
getting an expected payoff above 0.5. The value of the second signal is then higher than the
value of the third signal.
Note that additional signals always weakly increase the sender utility, because the feasible
set in the optimization problem is expanding. This is not necessarily the case for the receiver,
as we will see in our next application.
4.2 Optimal Advice Seeking
Our model also can be used to analyze the optimal advice seeking behavior of a receiver.
Suppose, before the game described in section 3.1 takes place, the receiver can choose the
cardinality of the signal space |S| “ k.
Letting the receiver decide the cardinality of the signal space allows them to change the
outcome in their favor. The receiver can choose to ask for “simple advice” consisting of
fewer action recommendations rather than a more complicated one. We will show through
an example that the receiver will not always prefer using rich signal spaces.
First, observe that if there is perfect alignment between the receiver and the sender’s
utilities, so that uˆR “ uˆS, the receiver will always pick the maximum number of signals
possible. This is because the sender’s utility (and therefore the receiver’s utility) is weakly
increasing in the number of signals available.
Let us now turn to the more interesting case of misalignment. Receiver’s preferences
over the number of signals will depend on the location of the prior and the degree of the
misalignment between the sender and the receiver. We will make this more clear with the
following example.
4.2.1 Example: Asking for Simple Advice
Suppose there are three states tω1, ω2, ω3u “ Ω and five actions A “ ta0, a1, a2, a3, a4u where
a0 denotes the default action taken at the prior belief µ0 “ p1{3, 1{3, 1{3q. For simplicity,
suppose the sender’s utility depends only on the actions taken, and the default action is the
worst outcome. The sender prefers inducing the actions a1, a2 and a3 over a0, and a2 and a3
are preferred over a1 and a4.
Receiver preferences are such that the optimal actions are a1, a2, a3 whenever the beliefs
are certain enough, meaning that upon observing signal s P S it is the case that µspωiq ą p¯i
for i P t1, 2, 3u. Moreover, whenever µspω2q ă p¯i and µspω3q ă p¯i but µspω2q`µspω3q ą p¯i the
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receiver takes action a4. This means that there are two different actions that the receiver
optimally takes when the beliefs are uncertain, which are a0 (uncertain but leaning ω1) and
a4 (uncertain but leaning ω2 or ω3). Figure 5 plots these preferences along with the optimal
2 and 3-signal information structures. The full utility function for the receiver is given in
the appendix B.3.
We consider the following game: the receiver will pick the cardinality of the signal space
k “ |S| first, sender observes this choice and picks the optimal Bayes plausible information
structure with k signals. By sequential rationality and our previous calculations we can char-
acterize the sender’s behavior using our results. Namely, the sender will pick the optimal
information structure for the k-constrained Bayesian Persuasion game, given the choice of k
by the receiver. Hence, the receiver will pick k “ |Ω| such that expected receiver utility is
maximized.
It is easy to verify that for every equilibrium (PBE) of this game the receiver will pick
k “ 2, as plotted in figure 5.11 For the receiver’s choice of k “ 2, the sender will pick the
information structure described by the red line in the lower left box in figure 5, inducing a2
and a1. Off path, for the choice of k “ 1 by the receiver, the sender will pick a trivial infor-
mation structure and for the choice of k “ 3, the sender will pick the information structure
shown with the blue triangle in the upper right corner in figure 5, inducing a1, a2, a3. Hence,
receivers picks k to be equal to 2. The lower right plot in figure 5 shows how the two-signal
information structure, three-signal information structure and the single-signal information
structure compare in terms of expected utility for the receiver.
We see that there is a misalignment between the receiver and the sender preferences. The
receiver prefers outcomes that are more certain about ω2 and ω3 whereas the sender only
wants to induce actions a2 and a3 and does not care about certainty in beliefs. The sender
ideally wants to induce uncertain posteriors leading to action a2 and a3 with high probability.
Limiting the sender to two signals, the receiver can force the sender to induce more
certain beliefs about ω2. This is because under the Bayes Plausibility constraint, imposing
k “ 2 forces the sender to induce a more certain posterior about ω2. With k “ 3, the sender
optimally induces vague posteriors about ω2 and ω3.
This example shows that the receiver might prefer to limit senders ability to communicate
and opt for simple advice. More elaborately, in the game considered above, we see that the
receiver prefers the expected outcome with two signals (k “ 2) over three signals (k “ 3),
and the expected outcome with three signals (k “ 3) over no communication at all (k “ 1).
Thus, in the optimal advice seeking game with partially misaligned preferences, the receiver
will profitably choose to limit the communication capacity of the sender, but not so much
11See appendix B.3 for utility functions.
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Figure 5: Partial misalignment and optimal advice seeking. In all figures, the black perpendicular line at
(1/3,1/3,1/3) represents the location of the prior. The top left figure depicts the sender’s utility over the
simplex, which depends only on the actions taken by the receiver. The top right figure shows the optimal
3-signal information structure, and the bottom left figure shows the optimal 2-signal information structure.
The bottom right figure depicts the receiver’s utility, with the optimal 2-signal (red line) and 3-signal (blue
surface) information structures. For the receiver, utility with 2 signals (red point) is higher than the utility
with 3 signals (blue point).
that no useful information can be transmitted at all.
The example also demonstrates an interesting property of cardinality constrained per-
suasion games. We see that the optimal information structures chosen with k “ 2 and k “ 3
are not Blackwell comparable. This observation implies that allowing the sender to use more
signals does not guarantee that a more informative information structure will be chosen. If
they were to be Blackwell comparable, we would have concluded that the receiver prefers
the more informative one since their preferences have to be convex over the entire simplex.12
This presents an interesting avenue for studying coarse communication. Information
Design and Bayesian Persuasion literature generally focuses on a variety of examples -e.g.
Judge-Prosecutor communication (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011)- where the receiver has
some power on the communication procedure. One way to reflect this power is letting the
receiver pick the cardinality of the sender’s signal space. The example above shows that
the receiver may prefer to pick k to be less than the cardinality of the action and state
space. Our framework can be used to analyze these interactions in detail by characterizing
the solutions to Bayesian Persuasion problems with coarse signal spaces.
12By Corollary 4 in appendix B.2.
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5 Conclusion
We set out to analyze the effect of coarseness in strategic communication. The value of
precise communication in a game where a sender is trying to persuade a receiver is char-
acterized and an upper bound for this value which applies to all finite persuasion games is
presented. This is done by proving the existence and characterizing the properties of an
optimal information structure in a game of persuasion with constrained signal spaces, which
was left unexplored by previous literature. In doing so, we develop a novel way of solving
finite Bayesian Persuasion problems and finding optimal information structures using Cho-
quet’s Theorem. Our work complements the asymptotic upper bound results of Le Treust
and Tomala (2019) on infinitely repeated persuasion games with noisy and coarse channels,
and the results in Tsakas and Tsakas (2018) on finite persuasion games over noisy channels.
We show that constrained signal spaces create non-trivial difficulties for the sender in a per-
suasion game and demonstrate how we can analyze the outcomes using k-convex hulls. In
settings where a receiver is asking for advice from a sender with misaligned preferences, we
show that it might be optimal to ask for simple recommendations. This gives us a better
understanding of settings in which the communication between parties can be limited by the
receiver (or a regulator).
With this general model, we can apply our framework to various settings where we would
like to learn about the willingness to pay of a sender for more precise messages. Some of the
most important questions studied using persuasion games can now be analyzed from this
new viewpoint. How much would a politician be willing to spend to design a more detailed
policy experiment to convince voters? How much would a lobbyist be willing to pay to send a
more precise action recommendation to the politician that they are trying to persuade? How
much would a firm trying to send product information to a potential customer be willing to
pay for a longer, more detailed ad?
Our model can also be used to study competition between senders who have access to sig-
nal spaces with different degrees of complexity, or the problem of a sender trying to persuade
a heterogeneous set of agents using public or private signals with different dimensionalities.
We leave these questions for future work.
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Appendices
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Given a P A Ra is the intersection of ∆pΩq, which is closed and convex, and finitely
many closed half spaces defined by tµ P R|Ω| : řωPΩ µpωqpupa, ωq ´ upa1, ωqq ě 0ua1PA. It is
therefore closed and convex.
Proof of Lemma 2
Follows directly from Volund (2018), Theorem 1 or Lipnowski and Mathevet (2017), The-
orem 1.
Proof of Lemma 3
We prove this claim by explicitly constructing τ 1. Using the convexity of uˆS within Ra,
we can find two alternative beliefs µ1, µ2 in BdpRaq, such that replacing µ with one of these
two beliefs maintains Bayes Plausibility and weakly increases Eτ uˆS.
Let supp pτq “ tµ1, µ2, . . . , µku. Since τ satisfies Bayes Plausibility, we have µ0 “ řki“1 τpµiqµi
for some τpµ1q, . . . , τpµkq, which satisfy ři τpµiq “ 1, and @i P t1, . . . ku 1 ą τpµiq ą 0. We
want to show that we can construct τ 1 which satisfies Bayes Plausibility and Eτ 1uˆS ě Eτ uˆS.
Without loss of generality, let µk P supp pτq be the belief pµk ‰ µ0q such that for some
Rk P R, µk P intpRkq. Consider the ray from µ0 passing through µk, parameterized as
tµ0 ` spµk ´ µ0q, s P R`u.
First, assume µ0 R Rk. Since µk P intpRkq, and Rk is closed, bounded, and convex, the
line segment passing through the interior point µk intersects BdpRkq at two points (Yaglom
and Boltyansky 1961). Let these two points be denoted as µ1k and µ2k. Since these two
points also lie on the ray passing through µk originating from µ0, they can be written in a
parametric form. Therefore, for some δ ą 0 and 1 ą γ ą 0 we have:
µ1k “ µ0 ` p1` δqpµk ´ µ0q “ µk ` δpµk ´ µ0q,
µ2k “ µ0 ` p1´ γqpµk ´ µ0q “ µk ´ γpµk ´ µ0q.
Moreover, we can write our original point µk as a convex combination of these two points
as γ
γ`δµ
1
k ` δγ`δµ2k “ µk. Note that by convexity of uˆS within Rk, we get:
γ
γ ` δ uˆ
Spµ1kq ` δγ ` δ uˆ
Spµ2kq ě uˆSpµkq. (1)
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Now, let us define two new information structures, τ 1 and τ 2, by replacing µk with µ1k
and µ2k, respectively. We will now show that we maintain Bayes Plausibility with these new
information structures.
Lemma 8. The new information structures τ 1 and τ 2, constructed as described above, are
Bayes Plausible.
Proof. Start with comparing τ 1 with τ . We have supp pτ 1q “ tµ1, . . . , µ1ku and supp pτq “
tµ1, . . . , µku. We know that τ is Bayes Plausible, so we have µ0 “ řki“1 τpµiqµi for some
τpµ1q, . . . , τpµkq, which satisfy ři τpµiq “ 1, and @i, 1 ą τpµiq ą 0.
We know that µ1k “ µ0` p1` δqpµk ´µ0q “ µk ` δpµk ´µ0q. Let us define a new probability
distribution τ 1 P ∆2pΩq representing µ0 i.e. µ0 “ řiăk τpµiqµi ` τ 1pµ1kqµ1k. Simple algebra
reveals that this equality will hold for τ 1:
τ 1pµiq “ τpµiqp1` δq
1` δ ´ τpµkqδ for i ă k and τ
1pµkq “ τpµkq
1` δ ´ τpµkqδ .
Note that 1 ` δ ´ τpµkqδ ą 0, and τpµkq ă 1 ` δ ´ τpµkqδ, so 1 ą τ 1pµkq ą 0. Also note
that τpµiqp1 ` δq ă 1 ` δ ´ τpµkqδ since τpµiq´11´τpµkq´τpµiq ă 0 ă δ. Therefore @i, 1 ą τ 1pµiq ą 0.
Finally: ÿ
iďk
τ 1pµiq “ p1` δq
ř
iăk τpµiq
1` δ ´ τpµkqδ `
τpµkq
1` δ ´ τpµkqδ “
1` δ ´ τpµkqδ
1` δ ´ τpµkqδ “ 1.
Similarly, take τ 2. We have supp pτ 2q “ tµ1, . . . , µ2ku and supp pτq “ tµ1, . . . , µku. We
know that µ2k “ µ0 ` p1 ´ γqpµk ´ µ0q “ µk ´ γpµk ´ µ0q. Let us define a new probability
distribution τ 2 P ∆2pΩq representing µ0 i.e. µ0 “ řiăk τ 2pµiqµi ` τ 2pµ2kqµ2k. Simple algebra
reveals that this equality will hold for τ 2:
τ 2pµiq “ τpµiqp1´ γq
1´ γ ` τpµkqγ for i ă k, and τ
2pµ2kq “ τpµkq1´ γ ` τpµkqγ .
Note that 1 ´ γ ` τpµkqγ ą 0 since γ ă 1. Also, τpµiqp1 ´ γq ă 1 ´ γ ` τpµkqγ since
@i, τpµiq ă 1. Therefore, @i, 1 ą τ 2pµiq ą 0. Finally:ÿ
iďk
τ 2pµiq “ p1´ γq
ř
iăk τpµiq
1´ γ ` τpµkqγ `
τpµkq
1´ γ ` τpµkqγ “
1´ γ ` τpµkqγ
1´ γ ` τpµkqγ “ 1.

We are now ready to prove the main theorem. Let Eτ 1uˆS and Eτ2uˆS be the sender’s util-
ity under the new information structures τ 1 and τ 2. Using the definitions of τ 1, τ 2, we can
calculate the difference between these new values and the sender’s utility under τ , which is
simply Eτ uˆS “ řiďk τpµiquˆSpµiq. Simple algebra shows the following:
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Eτ 1uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS “ uˆSpµ1kq ´ uˆSpµkq ` δ
˜˜ÿ
iďk
τpµiquˆSpµiq
¸
´ uˆSpµkq
¸
,
Eτ2uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS “ uˆSpµ2kq ´ uˆSpµkq ´ γ
˜˜ÿ
iďk
τpµiquˆSpµiq
¸
´ uˆSpµkq
¸
.
For a contradiction, suppose that both Eτ 1uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS ă 0 and Eτ2uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS ă 0. Rear-
ranging the above terms and multiplying with γ and δ respectively, we get:
γuˆSpµ1kq ` γδ
˜˜ÿ
iďk
τpµiquˆSpµiq
¸
´ uˆSpµkq
¸
ă γuˆSpµkq, and,
δuˆSpµ2kq ´ δγ
˜˜ÿ
iďk
τpµiquˆSpµiq
¸
´ uˆSpµkq
¸
ă δuˆSpµkq.
Which implies:
δuˆSpµ2kq ` γuˆSpµ1kq ă pδ ` γquˆSpµkq.
However, by inequality 1 implied by convexity, we have :
γ
γ ` δ uˆ
Spµ1kq ` δγ ` δ uˆ
Spµ2kq ě uˆSpµkq
ô δuˆSpµ2kq ` γuˆSpµ1kq ě pδ ` γquˆSpµkq
Therefore, we get a contradiction, so Eτ 1uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS ă 0 and Eτ2uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS ă 0 cannot hold
at the same time. We must have either Eτ 1uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS ě 0 or Eτ2uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS ě 0.
For the remaining case, assume µ0, µk P Rk. Since µk P intpRkq, and Rk is closed, bounded,
and convex, the ray originating from µ0 passing through µk intersects BdpRkq at a single
point, which we will denote by µ1k. Since µ1k lies on this line, for some δ ą 0, we will have:
µ1k “ µ0 ` p1` δqpµk ´ µ0q “ µk ` δpµk ´ µ0q
Moreover, we can write µk as a convex combination of µ
1
k and µ0, where
µ1k
1`δ ` δµ01`δ “ µk.
Consider a new information structure τ 1, where we replace µk with µ1k in τ , implying
supp pτ 1q “ tµ1, . . . , µ1ku. Similar to the first part of the proof, we construct a probabil-
ity distribution τ 1 P ∆2pΩq that represents µ0 i.e. we need tτ 1pµiquiďk to satisfy µ0 “ř
iăk τ
1pµiqµi ` τ 1pµ1kqµ1k. Simple algebra reveals that this equality will hold for τ 1:
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τ 1pµiq “ τpµiqp1` δq
1` δ ´ τpµkqδ for i ă k, and τ
1pµ1kq “ τpµkq1` δ ´ τpµkqδ .
Since the original information structure is assumed to be beneficial, we know that the payoff
is better than the payoff under receiver’s default action. This implies:
uˆSpµ0q ď
ÿ
iďk
τpµiquˆSpµiq
Also by the convexity of uˆS within Rk, we know that:
uˆSpµ1kq
1` δ `
δuˆSpµ0q
1` δ ě uˆ
Spµkq.
Now, let us calculate the difference in expected sender payoff between τ 1 and τ . We find
that:
Eτ 1uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS “ uˆSpµ1kq ´ uˆSpµkq ` δ
˜˜ÿ
iďk
τpµiquˆSpµiq
¸
´ uˆSpµkq
¸
.
For a contradiction, suppose that Eτ 1uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS ă 0. This implies the following:
uˆSpµ1kq ´ uˆSpµkq` ă δ
˜
uˆSpµkq ´
˜ÿ
iďk
τpµiquˆSpµiq
¸¸
ď δ `uˆSpµkq ´ uˆSpµ0q˘
ô 1
1` δ uˆ
Spµ1kq ` δ1` δ uˆ
Spµ0q ă uˆSpµkq.
This contradicts
uˆSpµ1kq
1`δ ` δuˆ
Spµ0q
1`δ ě uˆSpµkq, which we know to be true from the convexity of
uˆS within Rk. Therefore Eτ 1uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS ě 0 must hold.
Replacing each µk P supp pτq that is not on the boundary of a region Ra through the steps
described above, we can reach a τ 1 that yields weakly higher utility for the sender. This
completes the proof.
Proof of lemma 4
Let supp pτq “ tµ1, . . . , µku be affinely dependent. Then, there must exist tλ1, . . . , λku such
that
ř
iďk λi “ 0 and
ř
iďk λiµi “ 0. Since τ is Bayes Plausible, we have µ0 “
řk
i“1 τpµiqµi
for some τpµ1q, . . . , τpµkq, which satisfy ři τpµiq “ 1, and @i, 1 ą τpµiq ą 0.
Now, from the set tλ1, . . . , λku, some elements must be positive and some negative. Among
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the subset with negative weights, pick j˚ such that τpµjq
λj
is maximized. Among the subset
with positive weights, pick p˚ such that τpµpq
λp
is minimized. Now, we can write
µj˚ “
ÿ
i‰j˚
´ λi
λj˚
µi, and µp˚ “
ÿ
i‰p˚
´ λi
λp˚
µi.
Now, rewriting the Bayes Plausibility condition, we get:
τpµ1qµ1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` τpµj˚q
˜ÿ
i‰j˚
´ λi
λj˚
µi
¸
` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` τpµkqµk “ µ0
ô
ÿ
i‰j˚
ˆ
τpµiq ´ τpµj˚qλi
λj˚
˙
µi “ µ0, and analagously,
ÿ
i‰p˚
ˆ
τpµiq ´ τpµp˚qλi
λp˚
˙
µi “ µ0.
Now, we will show that @i ‰ j˚,
´
τpµiq ´ λi τpµjqλj˚
¯
ě 0 and @i ‰ p˚,
´
τpµiq ´ λi τpµkqλp˚
¯
ě 0.
If λi “ 0, the inequalities hold trivially.
If λi ą 0, the inequalities are equivalent to τpµiqλi ě
τpµj˚ q
λj˚
and τpµiq
λi
ě τpµp˚ q
λp˚
. In both cases,
the condition holds, because λj˚ is negative and λp˚ is chosen to minimize this ratio.
If λi ă 0, the inequalities are equivalent to τpµiqλi ď
τpµj˚ q
λj˚
and τpµiq
λi
ď τpµp˚ q
λp˚
. In both cases,
the condition holds, because λj˚ is chosen to maximize this ratio and λp˚ is positive.
Moreover, note that
ř
i‰j˚
´
τpµiq ´ λi τpµj˚ qλj˚
¯
“ p1´τpµj˚qq` τpµj˚ qλj˚ λj˚ “ 1, and analogously
for p˚. Therefore, we can define τ 1 and τ 2 respectively from τ by dropping µj˚ or µp˚ , and we
maintain Bayes Plausibility using convex weights
´
τpµiq ´ λi τpµj˚ qλj˚
¯
and
´
τpµiq ´ λi τpµp˚ qλp˚
¯
.
Now, writing Eτ 1uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS and Eτ2uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS, we get:
Eτ 1uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS “
ÿ
i‰j˚
ˆ
τpµiq ´ λi τpµj˚q
λj˚
˙
uˆSpµiq ´
ÿ
iďk
τpµiquˆSpµiq
Eτ2uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS “
ÿ
i‰p˚
ˆ
τpµiq ´ λi τpµp˚q
λp˚
˙
uˆSpµiq ´
ÿ
iďk
τpµiquˆSpµiq
ô Eτ 1uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS “ ´τpµj˚q
λj˚
˜ÿ
i‰j˚
λiuˆ
Spµiq
¸
´ τpµj˚quˆSpµj˚q
ô Eτ2uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS “ ´τpµp˚q
λp˚
˜ÿ
i‰p˚
λiuˆ
Spµiq
¸
´ τpµp˚quˆSpµp˚q.
Suppose Eτ 1uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS ă 0 and Eτ2uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS ă 0. This implies:
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´1
λj˚
˜ÿ
i‰j˚
λiuˆ
Spµiq
¸
´ uˆSpµj˚q ă 0, and ´1
λp˚
˜ÿ
i‰p˚
λiuˆ
Spµiq
¸
´ uˆSpµp˚q ă 0
ô 1
λj˚
˜ÿ
i‰j˚
λiuˆ
Spµiq
¸
` uˆSpµj˚q ą 0, and 1
λp˚
˜ÿ
i‰p˚
λiuˆ
Spµiq
¸
` uˆSpµp˚q ą 0.
However, note that by assumption, λj˚ and λp˚ have opposite signs. Multiplying the first
inequality by λj˚ and the second inequality by λp˚ , we must have:˜ÿ
iďk
λiuˆ
Spµiq
¸
ă 0, and
˜ÿ
iďk
λiuˆ
Spµiq
¸
ą 0.
Which is a contradiction. So Eτ 1uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS ă 0 and Eτ2uˆS ´ Eτ uˆS ă 0 cannot hold at the
same time, and either τ 1 or τ 2 must yield weakly higher expected utility for the sender.
Replace τ with the information structure that yields weakly higher utility using the process
defined above, which drops one belief that is affinely dependent. If the resulting information
structure is affinely independent, we’re done. If not, we can repeat the process described
above and we will either reach an affinely independent set of vectors before we get to two,
or we reach two vectors, which must be affinely independent. This completes the proof.
Proof of lemma 5 Existence and uniqueness comes from the Choquet’s Theorem be-
cause τ is a simplex, by the affine independence condition. Now given the convex weights
τ “ pτpµ1q, . . . , τpµkqq one can transform them to the Cartesian coordinates for µ0 by using
Tτ “
»—————–
µ1,1 µ2,1 . . . µk,1
µ1,2 µ2,2 . . . µk,2
...
...
...
...
µ1,n µ2,n . . . µk,n
1 1 . . . 1
fiffiffiffiffiffifl
where µi,j is the j’th coordinate of i’th posterior in supp pτq. Tτ is a matrix with dimensions
pn`1, kq, with linearly independent columns, which is guaranteed by the affine independence
of supp pτq. Let us denote µ0 “ pµ0,1, . . . , µ0,n, 1q which is the p1, n ` 1q vector of cartesian
coordinates of µ0 with an added 1 for the n` 1’st coordinate. Now we can write:
Tττ “ µ0.
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We also know the left inverse of Tτ exists by affine independence, denoted T
L
τ , which has
dimensions pk, n` 1q. Similarly, we can define Tτ 1 for any τ 1 P ζ. Then, we have:
Tττ “ µ0
Tτ 1τ
1 “ µ0
ô τ 1 “ TLτ 1Tττ
Where TLτ 1Tτ is an affine transformation that takes the convex weights of µ0 with respect
to k-simplex τ and maps to convex weights of µ0 with respect to k-simplex τ
1. The map
is bounded, because the two information structures are bounded polytopes. Hence they
are Lipschitz continuous, because bounded affine transformations are Lipschitz continuous.
Hence, τ is uniformly continuous. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1
The following definition will be useful.
Definition 6. Sa
1
a Ă Ra denotes the region where the sender preferred action a1 is taken
in region Ra. Formally S
a1
a Ă Ra is defined as Sa1a :“ tµ P ∆pΩq : µ P Ra and a1 P
Aˆpµq uˆSpa1, µq ě uˆSpa˜, µq @a˜ P Aˆpµqu.
We start by creating auxiliary payoff candidates. This only for illustrative purposes to
the reader. First define that: F a “ tF ai : F ai is a facet of Rau and
F “ tFi : @i “ 1, . . . , k Fi P F a for some a P Au .
uˆS is uniformly continuous in the interior of Ra as uˆ
S is piece-wise linear in the interior of Ra.
Then by Kirszbraun Theorem we can extend uˆS|intpRaq to a Lipschitz continuous function uˆ
S
a
defined over Ra with the same Lipschitz constant. Hence vˆa is uniformly continuous function
over Ra.
Before proceeding, the reader should note the following: Consider an information structure
supported on the boundary of an action zone Ra. There is a possibility that µl P BdpRaq
is the boundary is also defined by µl P BdpRa1q. The induced payoff of this informa-
tion structure can be represented in two ways:
ř
i‰l τpµiquˆSpapµiqq ` τpµlquˆSa papµlqq andř
i‰l τpµiquˆSpapµqiqq ` τpµlquˆSa1pa1pµlqq. But note that, since we are focusing on sender-
preferred equilibrium, the realized payoff at equilibrium corresponds to the payoff that en-
sures the higher payoff. Hence, the maximizing payoff we will obtain will always correspond
to the true payoffs, as auxiliary payoffs are always dominated by true payoffs. This can be
done analogously via showing that we can limit our attention to those action zones such that
sender utility can be extended uniformly continuously to the boundaries.
For each i “ 1, . . . , k, τpµiquˆSa pµiq is a product of uniformly continuous bounded functions,
hence it is uniformly continuous. Therefore the overall sum is uniformly continuous since
the finite sum of uniformly continuous functions is uniformly continuous.
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If the sender objective on ζF which is Eτ uˆ
S|ζf : ζF Ñ R is uniformly continuous, then
it can be extended to a continuous function on the closure of ζF , denoted Eτ uˆSa |ζf : ζF Ñ R.
Eτ uˆSa |ζf attains a maximum over ζF by Weierstraß theorem since ζF is bounded, and its
closure is compact by Heine-Borel Theorem.
Next, observe that ζF can be written as the intersection of three sets, ζF “ Σ X IF X A,
where we define:
1-The set of all Bayes Plausible information structures as Σ “ tpµ1, . . . , µkq P ∆pΩq : µ0 P
coptµ1, . . . , µnuqu
2- The set of information structures with supp pτq on F as IF .
3-The set of affinely independent information structures: A “ tpµ1, . . . , µkq P ∆pΩq :
pµ1, . . . , µkq is affinely independent.u
First, note that IF is a closed subset of R
kˆN because Cartesian products of closed sets
are closed. We proceed by proving the following claim.
Lemma 9. Σ is closed.
Proof. We will show this by contradiction. Suppose not. Then Dτ P Σ s.t. µ0 R copsupp pτqq.
If τ P Σ, then µ0 P copsupp pτqq, by definition of ζ. Then τ P Σ r Σ “ BdpΣq. Then τ is a
limit point of Σ. Denote the elements of supp pτq “ tµ1, . . . , µku.
So there exists a sequence tτ˜nunPN “ pµ˜n1 , . . . , µ˜nkq s.t. τ˜n P Σ @n P N and tτ˜nunPN con-
verges to τ . Since we supposed that τ R Σ there exists no such pα1, . . . , αkq that satisfies
αi ą 0 and řki“1 αi “ 1 s.t. řki“1 αiµi “ µ0. Furthermore since τ˜n P Σ for each n P N we
have unique α˜n “ pα˜n1 , . . . , α˜nkq s.t.
řk
i“1 α˜
n
i µ˜
n
i “ µ0 for each n P N by lemma 3.2. Then there
must exist a δ ą 0 such that @n P N, ||řki“1 α˜ni µ˜ni ´řki“1 α˜ni µi|| “ ||řki“1 α˜ni pµ˜ni ´ µiq|| ą δ,
where ||.|| denotes the Euclidean norm. Also by the fact that τ˜n Ñ τ we have that @ε ą 0
Dn P N s.t. ||τ˜n ´ τ ||F ă ε, where ||.||F denotes the Frobenius norm on RkˆN . So we get:
ε2 ą ||τ˜n ´ τ ||2F “
kÿ
i“1
||pµ˜ni ´ µiq||2 ą
kÿ
i“1
α˜ni ||pµ˜ni ´ µiq||2
ě ||
kÿ
i“1
α˜ni pµ˜ni ´ µiq||2 “ ||
kÿ
i“1
α˜ni µ˜
n
i ´
kÿ
i“1
α˜ni µi||2 ą δ2
Where the equality in the first line follows from the definition of the Frobenius norm, and
the second line follows from applying Jensen’s inequality. Then picking ε “ δ, we have δ ą δ,
a contradiction. Therefore, for any τ P Σ, µ0 P copsupp pτqq. This shows that Σ is closed.

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Now, let F denote the finite set of all possible collections F . We can characterize the
sender’s maximization problem as follows:
max
FPF pV pF, µ0, kqq
Where V pF, µ0, kq “ maxτPζF Eτ uˆSa |ζF if the maximum exists, and the added convention that
V pF, µ0, kq “ ´8, if the feasible set is empty or the maximum doesn’t exist for a given
collection F. Define V pF, µ0, kq analogously for
´
maxτPζF Eτ uˆ
S
a |ζf
¯
.
If ζF is nonempty, from the first part of the proof, we know that
´
maxτPζF Eτ uˆ
S
a |ζF
¯
at-
tains a maximum since it is a continuous function over a compact set. Note that ζF is
always nonempty for some F: trivially, we can find two facets of the Ra for which µ0 P Ra,
and define the line segment passing through µ0 with endpoints at these two facets as a Bayes
Plausible, affinely independent information structure13. Therefore maxFPF
´
V pF, µ0, kq
¯
also exists. Now we will show that the maximum of the original problem also exists by
showing:
max
FPF pV pF, µ0, kqq “ maxFPF
´
V pF, µ0, kq
¯
.
Denote the maximizing collection of facets for the second problem as F2 P F and let τ2 P ζF2
be the corresponding information structure for the maximization problem maxτPζF2 Eτ uˆ
S
a |ζF2 .
If τ2 P ζF2 , we’re done and maxFPF pV pF, µ0, kqq also exists. For the other case, suppose
τ2 P ζF2{ζF2 .
From the argument in the first part of this proof, we know:
ζF2 “ IF2 X ΣX A Ď IF2 X ΣX A
But we also have IF2 “ IF2 and Σ “ Σ. Hence ζF2 Ď IF2 X ΣX A. But then:
ζF2{ζF2 Ď
`
IF2 X ΣX A
˘ { pIF2 X ΣX Aq “ `IF2 X ΣX pA{Aq˘ .
So we must have τ2 P
`
IF2 X ΣX pA{Aq
˘
. However, if τ2 P pA{Aq, it is not affinely in-
dependent, then by Theorem 4, we can always find some F 1 P F and τ 1 P ζF 1 such that
Eτ 1uˆ
S
a |ζF 1 ě Eτ uˆSa |ζF , contradicting the fact that τ2 is the maximum. Therefore τ2 P ζF2{ζF2
cannot hold, and the maximum of the original problem will always exist. This completes the
proof of Theorem 1.
13If µ0 is an element of a single facet of Ra, then the argument still applies where the two points are on
the same facet.
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Proof of Theorem 2
Let τ be the optimal information structure solving the sender’s maximization problem given
in definition 4, and suppose for a contradiction, suptz|pµ0, zq P CHkpuˆSqu ‰ Eτ uˆS.
For the first case, let suptz|pµ0, zq P CHkpuˆSqu ă Eτ uˆS. However, taking the beliefs in
supp pτq “ tµ1, . . . , µku, we know that by the feasibility of τ , Dtτpµ1q, . . . , τpµkqu such thatř
iďk τpµiqµi “ µ0 and
ř
iďk τpµiq “ 1, 1 ě τpµiq ě 0. Thus, by definition 5, pµ0,Eτ uˆSq P
CHkpuˆSq. Therefore, we cannot have suptz|pµ0, zq P CHkpuˆSqu ă Eτ uˆS.
For the other case, let suptz|pµ0, zq P CHkpuˆSqu ą Eτ uˆS. Since pµ0, zq P CHkpuˆSq, take
the set of points tuˆSpµ1q, . . . , uˆSpµkqu and convex weights tα1, . . . , αku with řiďk αiµi “ µ0
and
ř
iďk αiuˆ
Spµiq “ z, also satisfying řiďk αi “ 1, 1 ě α ě 0. We know these points and
weights must exist by definition 5. Now observe that τ 1 “ tµ1, . . . , µku must be a feasible
solution to the sender’s maximization problem. tµ1, . . . , µku must be elements of some facets,
because otherwise by theorem 3, we can show the existence of another information structure
with higher expected utility, contradicting the fact that pµ0, zq is a supremum. It must also
be the case that tµ1, . . . , µku are affinely independent, because otherwise by theorem 4, we
can contradict pµ0, zq being a supremum again. We know that τ 1 satisfies Bayes Plausibility
by the definition given above. Therefore τ 1 P ζF for some facet combination F, and it could
have been picked instead of τ in the maximization problem, contradicting the optimality of
τ . This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 3
Suppose τk is the optimal information structure with k signals, and τk´1 is the optimal in-
formation structure with k ´ 1 signals. Denote by V ˚pkq, V ˚pk ´ 1q the utilities obtained
using these information structures.
Let supp pτkq “ tµ1, . . . , µku. Observe that we can create a k ´ 1 dimensional informa-
tion structure that maintains bayes plausability by choosing two posteriors, say µ1, µ2, and
define a new posterior as their mixture:
µ12 “ τkpµ1q
τkpµ1q ` τkpµ2qµ1 `
τkpµ2q
τkpµ1q ` τkpµ2qµ2
And define the new information structure with supp pτ 112q “ tµ12, µ3, . . . , µku, which main-
tains Bayes Plausibility with the new weights tpτkpµ1q ` τkpµ2qq, τpµ3q, . . . , τpµkqu.
Now, we can define k different information structures containing k ´ 1 posteriors each,
denoted µ12, µ23, . . . , µk´1,k, µk1 where we mix the consecutive posteriors µl, µl`1 and use the
weights defined above to satisfy Bayes Plausibility. By the optimality of τk´1 among the
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information structures with k ´ 1 signals, we must have the following k inequalities:
V ˚pk ´ 1q ě pτkpµ1q ` τkpµ2qquS
ˆ
τkpµ1q
τkpµ1q ` τkpµ2qµ1 `
τkpµ2q
τkpµ1q ` τkpµ2qµ2
˙
` τkpµ3quSpµ3q ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` τkpµkquSpµkq,
V ˚pk ´ 1q ě τkpµ1quSpµ1q ` pτkpµ2q ` τkpµ3qquS
ˆ
τkpµ2q
τkpµ2q ` τkpµ3qµ2 `
τkpµ3q
τkpµ2q ` τkpµ3qµ3
˙
` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` τkpµkquSpµkq,
...
V ˚pk ´ 1q ě τkpµ1quSpµ1q ` ¨ ¨ ¨ `
pτkpµk´1q ` τkpµkqquS
ˆ
τkpµk´1q
τkpµk´1q ` τkpµkqµk´1 `
τkpµkq
τkpµk´1q ` τkpµkqµk
˙
,
V ˚pk ´ 1q ě τkpµ2quSpµ2q ` τkpµ3quSpµ3q ` ¨ ¨ ¨ `
pτkpµ1q ` τkpµkqquS
ˆ
τkpµ1q
τkpµ1q ` τkpµkqµ1 `
τkpµkq
τkpµ1q ` τkpµkqµk
˙
Dividing all inequalities by k and summing up, we have:
V ˚pk ´ 1q ě k ´ 2
k
V ˚pkq ` 2
k
V 1 ě k ´ 2
k
V ˚pkq
Where V 1 is the utility gained from the k dimensional information structure consisting of the
posteriors tµ12, µ23, . . . , µk´1,k, µk1u. This implies the following upper bound on the value of
an additional signal at k ´ 1 signals:
V ˚pkq ´ V ˚pk ´ 1q ď 2
k
V ˚pkq
Equivalently, the following relationship must hold between the maximum utilities attainable
between k and k ´ 1 signals:
k ´ 2
k
V ˚pkq ď V ˚pk ´ 1q ď V ˚pkq
Proofs of the statements in section 4.1.1
Let pE, ~Eq denote an Euclidean affine space with E being an affine space over the set of
reals such that the associated vector space is an Euclidian vector space. We will call E the
Euclidean Space and ~E the space of its translations. For this example we will focus on three
34
dimensional Euclidian affine space i.e. ~E has dimension 3. We equip ~E with Euclidean dot
product as its inner product, inducing the Euclidian norm as a metric. To simplify notation,
we will simply write pR3, ~R3q. Given this structure, we can define the unitary simplex in
the affine space R3 by the following set where ωi corresponds to the point with 1 in its ith
coordinate and 0 in all of its other coordinates. We define the state space Ω “ tω1, ω2, ω3u.
The simplex then becomes:
∆pΩq “
"
µ P R3|µ “ λ1ω1 ` λ2ω2 ` λ3ω3 such that
3ÿ
i“1
λi “ 1 and 1 ą λi ą 0 @i P t1, 2, 3u
*
Building on the problem definition in the main text, we focus on Bayesian Persuasion games
where the receiver preferences are described with thresholds, i.e. the receiver prefers action
ai P ta1, a2, a3u if and only if the posterior belief µs P ∆pΩq such that µspωiq ě p¯i, and prefers
a0 otherwise. Hence, we can say that for i P t1, 2, 3u, j P t0, 1, 2, 3u and j ‰ i we have
EµsruRpai, ωqs ě EµsruRpaj, ωqs if and only if µspωiq ą p¯i. Define δ1 “ p0, 1 ´ p¯i,´p1 ´ p¯iqq,
δ2 “ p1´ p¯i, 0,´p1´ p¯iqq and δ3 “ p1´ p¯i,´p1´ p¯iq, 0q and Γ1 “ pp¯i, 0, 1´ p¯iq, Γ2 “ p0, p¯i, 1´ p¯iq
and Γ3 “ p0, 1´ p¯i, p¯iq. The action zones will become:
Ri “ tµs P ∆pωq|µis ě p¯iiu “ ∆pωq X tpµ´ Γiq ¨ δi ě 0|µ P R3u,
where ¨ denotes the Euclidean dot product.
Proof of lemma 6
Let us first characterize the set ∆c. We have
14 ∆c “ ∆pΩqzco2pR1 Y R2 Y R3qq. We note
that:
copR1 YR2q “coptω1, pp¯i, 1´ p¯i, 0q, pp¯i, 0, 1´ p¯iq, ω2, p1´ p¯i, p¯i, 0q, p0, p¯i, 1´ p¯iquq
“cotω1, pp¯i, 0, 1´ p¯iq, ω2, p0, p¯i, 1´ p¯iqu (2)
and similarly for copR1 YR3q and copR2 YR3q we have that
copR1 YR3q “cotω1, pp¯i, 1´ p¯i, 0q, ω3, p0, 1´ p¯i, p¯iqu (3)
copR2 YR3q “cotω2, p1´ p¯i, 0, p¯iq, ω3, p1´ p¯i, 0, p¯iqu (4)
The second line follows from the first line since the tω1, pp¯i, 0, 1 ´ p¯iq, ω2, p0, p¯i, 1 ´ p¯iqu
corresponds to the extreme points of coptω1, pp¯i, 1´p¯i, 0q, pp¯i, 0, 1´p¯iq, ω2, p1´p¯i, p¯i, 0q, p0, p¯i, 1´
p¯iquq. Similarly using equation (2), (3) and (4), copRiYRjq can be identified as the intersection
of a half space and the simplex i.e.
copR1 YR2q “ ∆pΩq X tpµ´ pp¯i, 0, 1´ p¯iqq ¨ p´p¯i, p¯i, 0q ě 0|µ P R3u (5)
copR1 YR3q “ ∆pΩq X tpµ´ pp¯i, 1´ p¯i, 0qq ¨ p´p¯i, 0, p¯iq ě 0|µ P R3u (6)
copR2 YR3q “ ∆pΩq X tpµ´ p1´ p¯i, p¯i, 0qq ¨ p0,´p¯i, p¯iq ě 0|µ P R3u (7)
14co denotes convex hull operator and cok denotes k-convex hull i.e. cokpAq are the points that can be
represented as convex combination of k elements in A.
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So we can define ∆c Ă ∆pΩq as ∆c “ ∆pΩqzco2pR1 Y R2 Y R3q. By (5), (6) and (7) we can
see that ∆c is defined as
∆c “ tµ “ pµ1, µ2, µ3q P ∆pΩq|@i P t1, 2, 3u, µi ą 1´ p¯iu
By definition of ∆c and ∆pΩq this set is non-empty if and only if p¯i ą 23 .
Proof of lemma 7
We can identify the upper bounds through the following problem:
V p2, µ0q “ max
iPt1,2,3u
ˆ
max
µ0P∆c,µiPRi,µ4PR4
1´ dpµi, µ0q
dpµ4, µ0q
˙
subject to µ0 P copµi, µ4q.
First note that by the symmetry of the problem choice of i is not relevant. Without
loss of generality we pick i “ 1. Moreover, the constraint that µ0 P copµi, µ4q implies
that we are searching for a point with the goal of minimizing the distance with µi and
maximizing the distance with µ4. The maximizing triple is therefore pµ0˚ , µ1˚ , µ4˚q with µ0˚ “
p1 ´ p¯i, 1 ´ p¯i, 2p¯i ´ 1q, µ1˚ “ p1´p¯i2 , 1´p¯i2 , p¯iq µ4˚ “ p0, 12 , 12q. The solution follows from two
observations. One is that given two points µ0 and µi there is a unique line passing through
these points hence µ4 is identified to be the furthest point on that line such that µ4 P R4.
The line always intersects with R4 as otherwise µ0 R ∆c by construction. Then we choose µ0
and µi to minimize dpµ0, µiq where dpµ0, µiq is measured in the space of translations of R3.
Given this solution, we have that:
||pp¯i, 1´ p¯i
2
,
1´ p¯i
2
q ´ p2p¯i ´ 1q, 1´ p¯i, 1´ p¯i|| “
?
6
2
p1´ p¯iq
||pp¯i, 1´ p¯i
2
,
1´ p¯i
2
q ´ p0, 1
2
,
1
2
qq|| “
?
6
2
p¯i
Giving us that V p2, µ0q “ 2p¯i´1p¯i . Similarly, we can solve:
V p2, µ0q “ min
iPt1,2,3u
ˆ
max
µiPRi,µ4PR4
ˆ
min
µ0P∆c
1´ dpµi, µ0q
dpµ4, µ0q
˙˙
subject to µ0 P copµi, µ4q.
We observe that the point µ0˚ “ B “ p13 , 13 , 13q is a solution. This follows from the fact that
B is the barycenter of the simplex, and R1, R2 and R3 are defined with the same threshold p¯i.
Thus, any prior µ0 ‰ B implies that the µ0 is closer to one of the action zones. Minimizing
the objective, we pick µ0˚ “ B. Now given this choice, we choose µ4 to maximize leading to
the choice of µ4˚ “ p0, 12 , 12q and µ1˚ “ p1´p¯i2 , 1´p¯i2 , p¯iq.
Interestingly, the posteriors induced in the optimal information structure for the two
problems are the same, but they are induced with different probabilities. This follows from
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the fact that the hyperplanes defining the action zones is parallel to one of the hyperplanes
defining the simplex. So we can write V p2, µ0q “ 13p¯i .
Proof of corollary 2
Observe that with fixed p¯i “ 2{3, we have V p2, µ0q “ 12 “ V p2, µ0q. Also, V p2, µ0q “ 2p¯i´1p¯i
is increasing in p¯i and V p2, µ0q “ 13p¯i is decreasing in p¯i. By continuity of distance, the ob-
jective function in the definition of V p2, µ0q and V p2, µ0q are continuous. So for any other
µ0 P ∆c, V p2, µ0q takes every value between V p2, µ0q and V p2, µ0q by intermediate value the-
orem. By definition of value of precision, V p2, µ0q ą 12 implies decreasing value of precision
and V p2, µ0q ă 12 implies increasing value of precision.
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B Additional Results and Details
B.1 Properties of uˆS and sender-preferred zones
Definition 7. Sa
1
a Ă Ra denotes the region where the sender preferred action a1 is taken
in region Ra. Formally S
a1
a Ă Ra is defined as Sa1a :“ tµ P ∆pΩq : µ P Ra and a1 P
Aˆpµq uˆSpa1, µq ě uˆSpa˜, µq @a˜ P Aˆpµqu.
Remark . Observe that by definition we have that @a, a1 P A we have that Sa1a Ď Sa1a1 .
Lemma 10. @a, a1 P A Sa1a is closed and convex.
Proof. We can define Sa
1
a “
´
Xa1‰a
 
µ P Ra : řiă0ďΩ µpωq `uSpa, ωq ´ uS pa1, ωq˘ ě 0(a1PApµq¯,
which is intersection of finitely many half-spaces and closed, convex set Ra. 
Lemma 11. @a, a1 P A, uˆS is an affine function over Sa1a .
Proof. For every posterior µ P ∆pΩq the receiver is indifferent between taking actions
a P Aˆpµq. For every µ P Sa1a receiver takes action a1, by definition of sender preferred equi-
librium. Given a fixed action a1, uˆSpa1q “ EµpuSpa, ωqq, which is affine over the simplex. 
Corollary 3. @a P A, uˆS is a continuous function over intpRaq.
Remark . uˆS has jump discontinuities only at µ P ∆pµq such that µ P Ra X Ra1 with Ra X
Ra1 “ BdpRaq XBdpRa1q.
B.2 Properties of uˆR and receivers preferences for signal space
cardinality
Lemma 12. In finite persuasion games, receiver utility in equilibrium maxaPA uˆRpa, ωq is
convex over ∆pΩq. In fact, it is a polyhedral convex function.
Proof. Observe that maxaPA uˆRpa, ωq “ maxaPA
"
tEµuRpa1, ωqua1PA
*
. EµuRpa1, ωq denotes
the expected utility for a fixed action a1 P A, which is an affine function over ∆pΩq, and
therefore convex. Then we have that epigraph of maxaPA uˆRpa, ωq is a polyhedral convex set.
15 
An immediate implication is the following.
Corollary 4. Let τ be the optimal information structure with k-signals and τ 1 be the optimal
information structure with with k ` 1 signals. If τ and τ 1 are Blackwell comparable we have
that receiver prefers τ 1 over τ .
The corollary follows from the definition of Blackwell comparability, and the fact that
the receiver preferences must be convex.
15f is a polyhedral convex function if and only if its epigraph is polyhedral, as defined in Rockafellar
(1970).
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B.3 Formal preferences for example 4.2.1 (Optimal Advice Seek-
ing)
We say that the sender’s utility only depends on the action, and a2 and a3 are preferred
over a1 and a4, and the default action is the least preferred action, which we call a0. For
the parametric example drawn in figure 5, we set uspa0q “ 0,uspa1q “ uspa4q “ 1,uspa2q “
uspa3q “ 10.
The receiver has preferred actions when their beliefs are certain about the states. When
the beliefs on ω1, ω2 or ω3 are high enough, they prefer a1, a2, a3 respectively. The default
action is a0, which is taken when the beliefs are ‘leaning towards’ ω1, and there is another
action a4, which is taken when the beliefs are ‘leaning away from’ ω1 but are not sufficiently
close to ω2 or ω3. Formally, for the example in the figure, we define receiver utility as follows:
urpω1, a0q “ ´1, urpω2, a0q “ 12, urpω3, a0q “ 12
urpω1, a1q “ 10{3, urpω2, a1q “ 10{3, urpω3, a1q “ 10{3
urpω1, a2q “ ´100{3, urpω2, a2q “ 83{3, urpω3, a2q “ ´100{3
urpω1, a3q “ ´100{3, urpω2, a3q “ ´100{3, urpω3, a3q “ 83{3
urpω1, a4q “ ´50{3, urpω2, a4q “ 58{3, urpω3, a4q “ 58{3
B.4 Simplicity in Persuasion
In the main text, we have shown that we can restrict attention to affinely independent struc-
tures while searching for the optimal information structure. The goal of this section is to
clarify the connection between affine independence of information structures, preferences
towards simplicity and cognitive costs arising from complexity. We formalize cognitive costs
by making the sender not only care about the payoffs of the persuasion game, but also the
complexity of the information structures implemented.
Our approach and definition of complexity is motivated by the seminal paper of Rubin-
stein (1986) who studies complexity of automata strategies in repeated games. We opt for
a similar simple formalization that defines complexity of an information structure by the
number of different posteriors induced i.e. the cardinality of the support of τ P ∆p∆pΩqq.
This can be analogously thought as having a mental cost for each posterior induced by a
signaling strategy. We work on the limiting case of infinitesimal costs. Thus, the sender
primarily cares about the payoff, and cares lexicographically, only secondarily, about the
number of posteriors induced. Formally, we can define the preference relation ą of the
sender by defining
τ ą τ 1 if pEτ uˆs,´|supp pτq|q ąL pEτ 1uˆs,´|supp pτ 1q|q
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where ąL is the usual lexicographic16 order on R2.
This notion of complexity is fairly simple and intuitive, and captures some important
considerations. The simplest way to motivate the cost of an additional signal is by assum-
ing that generating higher dimensional signals is costly, and committing to an information
structure with more signals and more action recommendations implies that the sender should
invest in more capacity to send each different signal that is sent with positive probability.
Given a standard persuasion game with no limitations on the signal space and a sender
who has preferences for simplicity, we can extend the result of Theorem 2. We can now state
affine independence as a necessary condition of optimality and state that for every informa-
tion structure τ whose support µ is not affinely independent there exists a strictly better
information structure that is preferred by the sender. The result follows from the construc-
tion provided in the proof of Theorem 2. Existence of the optimal information structure is
again established by Theorem 3.
These observations present an additional property of affinely independent information
structures, as they also happen to be the simplest (in the sense of the lexicographic order
defined above) possible information structures, within the set of information structures that
achieve the same utility level. Hence, our analysis of Bayesian Persuasion with coarse com-
munication yields a general solution to Bayesian Persuasion games where the agents have
preferences for simplicity.
The lexicographic preference order defined above is analogous to having infinitesimal
costs for additional signals. In general, using our definition for the value of precision, the
sender can decide whether it is worth incurring the cost of an additional signal when costs
are non-trivial.
C Extension: Continuum of States
In this section, we will extend our results to the case where the state of the world ω can
take values in a continuum i.e. Ω “ ra, bs. Without loss of generality, set a “ 0, b “ 1.
Sticking to our usual notation, let τ be a signal or an information structure, and the signal
space be S with cardinality K. The general setting is akin to Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016).
Suppose the action of the receiver only depends on the expected value of the state vari-
able, Eµpωq, where µ is a posterior belief (a probability distribution) over Ω. Let F0 be the
CDF of the prior belief, with the mean m0. A signal realization s P S will induce a posterior
belief with CDF µs.
16px1, x2q ąL py1, y2q if and only if x1 ą y1 or x1 “ y1 and x2 ą y2. That is to say that τ ą τ 1 if and only
if Eτ uˆs ą Eτ 1 uˆs or Eτ uˆs “ Eτ 1 uˆs and |supp pτq| ă |supp pτ 1q|.
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Each signal or information structure τ will induce at most K different posterior CDF’s,
denoted tµ1, . . . , µku with corresponding means tm1, . . . ,mku. Note that τ will now induce a
probability distribution over posterior means. Denote CDF of this distribution of posterior
means by G.
We make the following assumptions: The set of actions A has cardinality and that there
exists cutoffs γ0, . . . , γm such that when Eµpωq P rγi, γi`1s, the action ai is optimal for the
receiver. Additionally we assume that the sender’s utility depends only on receiver’s action
and that u is an affine-closed function, and satisfies regularity conditions, defined in Dwor-
czak and Martini (2019). Further, assume that the prior CDF, F0, be continuous and have
full support over Ω. These assumptions ensure that the optimal signal creates a distribution
of posterior means which is a monotone partitional signal.
A monotone partitional signal partitions the state space into at most K continuous intervals
such that for any interval in trxi, xi`1suKi“0, all the mass of G is on EpX|X P rxi, xi`1sq.
Let c0 be the integral of the posterior mean function for the completely uninformative signal,
which will be equal to 0 below the prior mean, and a linear function with slope 1 above the
prior mean. Similarly, let c1 be the integral of the posterior mean function for the fully re-
vealing signal (which will use infinitely many signals). This signal reveals the state exactly.
Therefore it will be equal to the integral of the prior.
It is shown by Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) that the function c for any form of sig-
nal must lie between c0 and c1. Note that both of these depend on the prior. Now, note the
following observation: the cardinality of the signal space K, determines how many ’kinks’
the function c will have.
It is straightforward to observe that , with k monotone partitional signals, we will have
k ’kinks’ and a k ` 1 piecewise linear functions as c. This follows from the fact that we are
interested in the integral of G. Therefore the sender’s problem reduces to choosing the loca-
tion of these k kinks and the slope of the function c at each kink, subject to the constraint
that c lies between c0 and c1. Remember our assumption of the existence of action cutoffs
γ0, . . . , γm such that when Eµpωq P rγi, γi`1s, the action ai is optimal for the receiver. The
relationship between γ0, . . . , γm and the signal partitions will not be obvious when K ăM .
More precisely, let cG denote the integral of G, cGpxq “
şx
0
Gptqdt. cG is a convex func-
tion and we can analyze c instead of analyzing signal distributions as in Gentzkow and
Kamenica (2016). This definition also makes our focus on piecewise linear functions more
clear. Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) shows that each function in this interval can be
represented by a signaling policy and vice versa. We will focus on solving the problem by
choosing a function between c0 and c1 instead of finding signaling policies for tractability
purposes. Let γ1, . . . , γm be the action cutoffs, and let cpxq be the chosen c function, with c1
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representing the left derivative. Action one is taken when cGpxq ă γ1. Let U1 be the sender
utility when action 1 is taken. Action two is taken when γ1 ě cGpxq ă γ2, let U2 be sender
utility when action 2 is taken, and so forth. The sender’s utility is then
Upc1q “
mÿ
k“1
pc1pγkq ´ c1pγk´1qqUk
with the convention that γ0 “ 0 and c1pγ0q “ 0.
The set of possible functions c as:
Fk “ tf P Cr0, 1s|D a partitioning of [0,1] into k intervals: tslukl“1 “ tp0, x1s, px1, x2s, . . . , pxk´2, xk´1s, pxk´1, 1su
and tφl P Rukl“1such that: k ă K, DM P N @l P t1, . . . , ku 0 ď φl ăM,φl ď φl`1,
and each s is connected and has non-zero measure, where f can be written as:
fpxq “ 1xPs1pφ1xq `
kÿ
l“2
1xPsl
˜
φlx´
lÿ
j“2
pφj ´ φj´1qxj´1
¸
u
Given the definitions and the signal space of focus we establish existence of an optimal
information structure for the sender.
Theorem 4. UpcGq attains its maximum over Fk.
Proof. The proof proceeds by a series of lemmas:
Lemma 13. Fk is pre-compact
Proof. By Arzela-Ascoli theorem, proving pre-compactness suffices to showing equi-continuity
and equi-boundedness. Note that the way that Fk defined ensures that its elements are Lip-
schitz continuous. Then we have that equi-boundedness trivially. For equi-continuity pick
M P N that is the largest Lipschitz constant for the set of functions in F and a set of
functions with bounded Lipschitz constant forms an equicontinuous set. 
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Lemma 14. Fk is closed.
Proof.
Suppose there exists a sequence of functions where @n P N, fn P Fk and fn Ñ f uni-
formly. We will show that f P Fk.
First, observe that all fn are Lipschitz continuous, and therefore f must be Lipschitz contin-
uous, in addition to being convex. Therefore f is differentiable almost everywhere. Let the
set D Ă r0, 1s represent the set of points where f is differentiable.
Since fn Ñ f uniformly and fn, f are convex, we have that @x P D, f 1npxq Ñ f 1pxq. We
proceed by proving the following claim.
p0, 1qzD can have at most cardinality K.
Suppose not. Pick K ` 1 elements from p0, 1q{D and call this set X. By subclaim 2,
@x P X, we can find hpxq ą 0 such that @h P r0, hpxqq, there exists some Nhpxq P N such
that @n ą Nhpxq, fnpxq and fnpx ´ hq are on the same linear piece. Similarly, we can also
find qpxq ą 0 such that @q P r0, qpxqq, there exists some Nqpxq P N such that @n ą Nqpxq,
fnpxq and fnpx ` qq are on the same linear piece. Since there are K ` 1 elements in X, we
can compute q˚ “ minxPXpqpxqq, h˚ “ minxPXphpxqq, and N˚ “ maxxPXpmaxpNhpxq, Nqpxqqq.
Since f is differentiable almost everywhere, for every x P X Ď pp0, 1q{Dq, there must exist
1pxq ą 0 such that f is differentiable in the interval px´ 1pxqq and also 2pxq ą 0 such that
f is differentiable in the interval px` 2pxqq. Let ˚ “ minxPXpminp1pxq, 2pxqqq.
Define  “ minph˚, q˚, ˚q. Now, @x P X, and @n ą N˚, we have that f 1n “ c1pxq within
the interval px ´ , xq, and f 1n “ c2pxq within the interval px, x ` q, for some constants
c1pxq, c2pxq. The intervals px´ , xq and px, x` q are contained by the set D for every value
of x, by definition. By the fact that within the set D, f 1n Ñ f 1, we must have f 1 “ c1pxq
within px´ , xq and f 1 “ c2pxq within px, x` q.
Since f is continuous and convex, and @x P X, f 1pxq doesn’t exist, we must have that
@x, c1pxq ă c2pxq. However, this implies that @n ą N˚, f 1n also takes at least K ` 2 unique
values, which contradicts the fact that fn P Fk, i.e., fn cannot be K-piecewise linear. This
completes the proof that p0, 1q{D can have at most cardinality K.
Without loss of generality, suppose the set has cardinality K. The case where the car-
dinality is less than K will be analogous. Let us order the elements of p0, 1q{D as 0 ă
x1 ă x2 ¨ ¨ ¨ ă xK ă 1. Take the collection of intervals whose union is r0, 1s as tsluKl“1 “
tr0, x1s, px1, x2s, . . . , pxK , 1su. Within the interior of each interval, f is differentiable, hence
we must have f 1n Ñ f 1. Observe that f 1 can take at most K ` 1 unique different values,
because otherwise the convergence of f 1n cannot hold. Moreover, f 1 must be constant within
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the interior of each interval, since otherwise the cardinality of p0, 1q{D would exceed K.
Therefore, we can write @l ă K : @x P intpslq, φl “ f 1pxq, and hence fpxq “ φlx ` cl
for some c. Moreover, since @n P N, fn and f are continuous, @x P p0, 1q{D, we must have:
lim
Ñ0 fpx` q “ limÑ0 fpx´ q “ limÑ0φl`1px` q ` cl`1 “ limÑ0φlpx´ q ` cl
Therefore to preserve continuity we must have cl`1 ´ cl “ ´pφl`1 ´ φlqx. Also, observe that
within the first interval r0, x1s, we have f 1n Ñ f 1 “ φ1 and fnpxq “ φ1,nxÑ fpxq “ φ1x` c1.
It follows that we must have c1 “ 0 to have convergence in derivatives and in values within
the interval.
This shows that for l ě 2, cl “ ´řli“2pφi ´ φi´1qxi´1. Therefore, f must have the de-
sired form and f P Fk. This completes the proof that it is closed. 
Corollary 5. Fk is compact.
Proof. Follows from two lemmas above and the definition of a pre-compact set. 
Lemma 15. U(c) is continuous over Fk.
Proof. Let fn P C be a sequence of convex functions such that fn Ñ f uniformly. This
implies : dpfn, fq “ supt|fnpxq ´ fpxq|, x P r0, 1su Ñ 0 as n Ñ 8. We need to show
Upfnq Ñ Upfq.
By above lemma, since U only depends on the left derivatives on fixed and exogenous points
γ1, . . . , γk, then we will have Upfnq Ñ Upfq. Uniform convergence implies pointwise conver-
gence, therefore f is convex.
Since f is convex, there will exist left and right derivatives at every point. For any γ
value, and for any  ą 0, we need to show DN P N such that @n ą N , |f 1npγq ´ f 1pγq| ă 
where we write the left derivative at γ as:
f 1pγq “ lim
hÑ0´
fpγ ` hq ´ fpγq
h
We proceed by proving two useful claims.
Claim 1. Dh1 ą 0 such that @0 ď h ă h1, fpγ ´ hq and fpγq are on the same linear
piece, meaning that: fpγ ´ hq “ βpγ ´ hq and fpγq “ βγ for some β ą 0.This implies
f 1pγ ´ hq “ f 1pγq, @0 ď h ă h1.
44
Proof. Follows from the fact that in our definition each linear piecewise interval is connected
and has strictly non zero measure. 
Claim 2. Dh2 ą 0 that satisfies the following : @h P r0, h2q, there exists some Nh P N for
which it holds that @n ą Nh, fnpγ ´ hq and fnpγq are on the same linear piece.
Proof. Suppose not. For any given h2 ą 0, for all h P r0, h2q, there exists no Nh. Meaning
that, @n P N, fnpγ ´ hq and fnpγq are not on the same linear piece. Implying that, for
any 0 ď h ă h2, for any n: there must be some βn, θn where fnpγ ´ hq “ βnpγ ´ hq and
fnpγq “ θnγ where βn ă θn by convexity. Thus, |fnpγq ´ fnpγ ´ hq| “ |pθn ´ βnqγ ` βnh|.
However, each fn is also continuous, by convexity. This implies that, at the point γ: @ ą 0,
Dδ ą 0 such that if |x´ γ| ă δ, then |fnpxq ´ fnpγq| ă .
For any fn, choose  “ pθn ´ βnqγ. Then, there exists some δ such that |x ´ γ| ă δ implies
|fnpxq ´ fnpγq| ă pθn ´ βnqγ But then we can choose h where h ă h2 and h ă δ is satisfied.
Which means that we will have: |fnpγq´ fnpγ´hq| “ |pθn´ βnqγ` βnh| “ pθn´ βnqγ` βnh
from the first argument, and|fnpγq ´ fnpγ ´ hq| ă pθn ´ βnqγ from the second argument.
Therefore we have reached a contradiction. This completes the proof of claim 2. 
Proceeding with the proof of lemma 13, we have that uniform convergence implies pointwise
convergence, therefore f is convex. Since f is convex, there will exist left and right deriva-
tives at every point. For any γ value, and for any  ą 0, we need to show DN P N such that
@n ą N , |f 1npγq ´ f 1pγq| ă . Where we write the left derivative at γ as:
f 1pγq “ lim
hÑ0`
fpγ ´ hq ´ fpγq
´h
Suppose an  ą 0 is given. By claim 1 and claim 2, pick an h ă minth1, h2u. We have that:
f 1pγq ´  ă fpγ ´ hq ´ fpγq´h “ f
1pγq “ f 1pγ ´ hq ă f 1pγq ` 
For the picked number h, by claim 2, let Nh be the number where @n ą Nh, fnpγ ´ hq and
fnpγq are on the same linear piece.
Since fn converges to f , there exists Nc P N such that @n ą Nc:
f 1pγq ´  ă fnpγ ´ hq ´ fnpγq´h ă f
1pγq ` 
Let N ą tNh, Ncu. Then, @n ą N , the convergence result holds, and fnpγ´hq and fnpγq are
on the same linear piece. The following argument holds for all n ą N : Since fnpγ ´ hq and
fnpγq are on the same linear piece, we must have that the left derivatives are the same at
these two points and f 1npγq “ fnpγ´hq´fnpγq´h . By direct substitution to the inequality above:
f 1pγq ´  ă f 1npγq ă f 1pγq ` 
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ô ´ ă f 1npγq ´ f 1pγq ă 
ô |f 1npγq ´ f 1pγq| ă 
Therefore the left derivatives converge and Upfnq Ñ Upfq, which completes the proof
that U(c) is continuous over Fk.

With all the lemmas, the proof of theorem 4 follows immediately by topological extreme
value theorem17. We have proved the existence of an optimal monotone partitional informa-
tion structure. 
17Let pS, dSq and pR, dq be metric spaces d is the usual Euclidean metric defined for all x, y dpx, yq “ |x´y|.
Also let X Ď S be a compact subset of S f : S Ñ T be continuous on all of X. Then fpXq is closed and
bounded in T and f achieves its supremum and infimum on X, that is, there exists p, q P X such that
fppq “ suptfpxq : x P Xu and fpqq “ inftfpxq : x P Xu
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